FROM THE LIBRARY OF
REV. LOUIS FITZGERALD BENSON. D. D.
BEQUEATHED BY HIM TO
THE LIBRARY OF
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013
http://archive.org/details/worksofreverendl05watt
c o-» t
r WORKS
OF THE
REVEREND AND LEARNED
ISAAC WATTS, D.D.
CONTAINING, BESIDES HIS
SERMONS, AND ESSAYS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS,
SEVERAL ADDITIONAL PIECES,
§>elertefci from %% Manuscripts;
BY THE
REV. DR. JENNINGS, AND THE REV. DR. DODDRIDGE, IN 1753:
TO WHICH ARS PREFIXED,
MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF THE AUTHOK,
COMPILED
BY THE REV. GEORGE BURDER.
TN SIX VOLUMES. VOL. V.
ILontJon :
PRINTED BY AND FOR JOHN BARFIELD, W ARDOUR- STREET,
PRINTER TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF WALES.
1810.
CONTENTS
OF THE
FIFTH VOLUME.
LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE
AFTER
X HE Introduction and general Scheme 5
THE FIRST PART OF LOGICK. Of Perceptions and Ideas ------ 9
CHAPTER I. Of the Nature of Ideas ------- 9
CHAPTER II. Of the Objects of Perception - - - - 10
Sect. I. Of Being in general - - - - 10
Sect. II. Of Substances, and their various Kinds 11
Sect. III. Of Modes in their various Kinds; and first of essential and acci- dental Modes 13
Sect. IV. The further Divisions of Mode 16
Sect. V. Of the Ten Categories. Of Substance modified -------
Sect. VI. Of Not-Being
CHAPTER III.
18 18
Of the several Sorts of Perceptions or Ideas 19
Sect. I. Of sensible, spiritual, and ab- stracted Ideas --------- 19
Sect IT. Of simple and complex, com- pound and collective Ideas - - - - 22
Sect. III. Of universal and particular Ideas, real and imaginary ----- 22
Sect. IV. The Division of Ideas, with Regard to their Qualities ----- 25
OF REASON IN THE INQUIRY TRUTH.
CHAPTER IV.
Of Words and their several Divisions, to- gether with the Advantage and Danger of them 28
Sect. I. Of Words in general, and their Use 28
Sect. II. Of negative and positive Terms SI
Sect. III. Of simple and complex Terms 32
Sect. IV. Of Words, common and proper 33
Sect. V. Of concrete and abstract Terms 34
Sect. VI. Of univocal and equivocal Terms ----------- 34
Sect. VII. Various Kinds of equivocal Words 35
Sect. VIII. The Origin, or Causes of equivocal Words -------- 38
CHAPTER V.
General Directions relating to our Ideas 40
CHAPTER VI.
Special Rules to direct our Conceptions of Things ----------- 44
Sect. I. Of gaining clear and distinct Ideas ----------- 44
Sect. II. Of the Definition of Words or Names ----------- 45
Sect. III. Directions concerning the De- finition of Names ------- 46
Sect. IV. Of the Definition of Things a 2
bS
iv
CONTENTS.
PAGE
Sect. V. Rules of Definition of the Thing 55
Sect. VI. Observations concerning the Definition of Things ------ 57
Sect. VII. Of a complete Conception of Things ----------- 61
Sect. VIII. Of Division, and the Rules of it- 62
Sect. IX. Of a comprehensive Concep- tion of Things, and of Abstraction - - 64
Sect. X. Of the extensive Conception of Things, and of Distribution - - - - 66
Sect. XI. Of an orderly Conception of Things ----------- 69
Sect. XII. These Five Rules of Concep- tion exemplified -------- 69
Sect. XIII. An Illustration of these Five Rules by Similitudes ------- 71
THE SECOND PART OF LOGICK.
Of Judgment and Proposition - - - - 73
CHAPTER I.
Of the Nature of a Proposition, and its several Parts --------- 74
CHAPTER II.
Of the various Kinds of Propositions - - 15
Sect. I. Of universal, particular, indefi- nite, and singular Propositions - - - 75
Sect. II. Of affirmative and negative Pro- positions ----------- 79
Sect. III. Of the Opposition and Con- version of Propositions ------ 81
Sect. IV. Of pure and modal Proposi- tions 82
Sect. V. Of single Propositions, whether simple or complex ------- 83
Sect. VI. Of compound Propositions - - 84
Sect. VII. Of true and false Propositions 87
Sect. VIII. Of certain and dubious Pro- positions of Knowledge and Opinion - 89
Sect. IX. Of Sense, Consciousness, In- telligence, Reason, Faith, and Inspira- tion 90
PAGE
CHAPTER III".
The Springs of false Judgment, or the Doc- trine of Prejudices ------- 94
Introduction ---------- 94
Sect. I. Prejudices arising from Things - 9-5
Sect. II. Prejudices arising from Words 98
Sect. III. Prejudices arising from Our- selves ------------ 100
Sect. IV. Prejudices arising from other Persons ,---------- 107
CHAPTER IV.
General Directions to assist us in judging aright ----------- 115
CHAPTER V.
Special Rules to direct us in judging of particular Objects - ------- jgg
Sect. I. Principles and Rules of Judg- ment concerning the Objects of Sense - 124
Sect. II. Principles and Rules of Judg- ment in Matters of Reason and Specula- tion ----- - 126
Sect. III. Principles and Rules of Judg- ment in Matters of Morality and Reli- gion ---- 128
Sect. IV. Principles and Rules of Judg- ment in Matters of human Pudence - 131
Sect. V. Principles and Rules of Judg- ment in Matters of human Testimony - 132
Sect. VI. Principles and Rules of Judg- ment in Matters of Divine Testimony - 134
Sect. VH. Principles and Rules of judg- ing concerning Things past, present, and to come, by the mere Use of Reason - - 136
THE THIRD PART OF LOGICK.
Of Reasoning and Syllogism - - - - 138
CHAPTER I.
Of the Nature of a Syllogism, and the Parts of which it is composed - - - 138
CHAPTER II.
Of the various Kinds of Syllogisms, with particular Rules relating to them - - 140
Sect. I. Of universal and particular Syllo- gisms, both negative and affirmative - 140
CONTENTS.
Sect. IT. Of plain simple Syllogisms, and their Rules ---------- 141
Sect. III. Of the Moods and Figures of simple Syllogisms -------142
Sect. IV. Of complex Syllogisms - - 144
Sect. V. Of conjunctive Syllogisms - - 14G
Sect. VI. Of compound Syllogisms - - 148
Sect. VII. Of the Middle Terms, of com- mon Places or Topics, and Invention of Arguments ----------150
Sect. VIII. Of several Kinds of Argu- ments and Demonstrations ----- 152
CHAPTER III.
The Doctrine of Sophisms
154
Sect. I. Of several Kinds of Sophisms, and their Solution ------- 154
Sect. II. Two general Tests of true Syllo- gisms, and Methods of solving all Sophisms ---------- 158
CHAPTER IV.
Some general Rules to direct our Reasoning lGO
THE FOURTH PART OF LOGICK. Of Disposition and Method - - : - - 166
CHAPTER I.
Of the Nature of Method, and the several Kinds of it, viz. natural and arbitrary, synthetic and analytic ------- 16G
CHAPTER II.
The Rules of Method, general and parti- cular ----------- 171
THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MIND;
OR, A SUPPLEMENT TO THE ART OF LOGICK.
PART I.
Directions for the Attainment of useful Knowledge --------- 1 85
Introduction ---------- 135
CHAPTER I.
General Rules for the Improvement of Knowledge ------_--] 87
CHAPTER II.
Observation, Reading, Instruction by Lec- tures, Conversation, and Study, compared 1 96
CHAPTER III.
Rules relating to Observation - - - - 203
CHAPTER IV. Of Books and Reading ------- 207
CHAPTER V. Judgment of Books - - - 213
CHAPTER VI.
Of living Instructions and Lectures, of Teachers and Learners ------ 221
CHAPTER VII.
Of learning a Language ------ 223
CHAPTER VIII.
Of inquiring into the Sense and Meaning of any Writer or Speaker, and especially the Sense of the sacred Writings - - - 228
CHAPTER IX.
Rules of Improvement by Conversation - 230
CHAPTER X.
Of Disputes ---------- 239
CHAPTER XI.
The Socratical Way of Disputation - - 246
CHAPTER XII. Of forensic Disputes 248
takes
v! CONTEXTS.
CHAPTER XIII. Of academic or scholastic Disputation - - 249
CHAPTER XIV. Of Study, or Meditation ------
CHAPTER XV. Of fixing the Attention ------
CHAPTER XVI. Of enlarging the Capacity of the Mind
CHAPTER XVII.
Of improving the Memory - - - - -
CHAPTER XVIII. Of determining a Question - - - - -
CHAPTER XIX.
Of inquiring into Causes and Effects - -
CHAPTER XX.
Of the Sciences, and their Use in particular Professions ----------
PART II. The Communication of Useful Knowledge Introduction ------_-__
CHAPTER I.
Methods of Teaching, and reading Lectures
255 262 204 274
287 298
300
317 321
321
CHAPTER II.
Of an instructive Style - - -
CHAPTER III.
Of convincing other Persons of any Truth, or delivering them from Errors and Mis-
3C9
CHAPTER IV.
Of Authority. Of the Abuse of it: And of its real and proper Use and Service - -
CHAPTER V.
Of treating and managing the Prejudices of Men
- 33S
CHAPTER VI.
Of Instruction by Preaching
- 344
Sect. I. Wisdom better than Learning in the Pulpit
344
Sect. II. A branching Sermon - - - 347
Sect. III. The Harangue ----- 348
CHAPTER VII.
Of writing Books for the Public - - - 351
CHAPTER VIII.
Of Writing and Reading Controversies - 354
Sect. I. Of writing Controversies - - 354
Sect. II. Of reading Controversies - - 355
A DISCOURSE ON THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN AND
YOUTH.
INTRODUCTION. Of the Importance of Education, and the Design of this Discourse, witli a Plan of it
357
SECTION I.
Of instructing Children in Religion - - 358
SECTION II.
The Exercise and Improvement of their natural Powers -------- 3C0
SECTION III. Self-Government 365
CONTENTS.
VI 1
SECTION IV. The common Arts of Reading and Writing 369
SECTION V. Of a Trade or Employment ----- 371
SECTION VI. Rules of Prudence 373
SECTION VII.
The Ornaments and Accomplishments of Life - - - -. 375
SECTION VIII.
A Guard against evil Influences from Per- sons and Things -------- 380
SECTION IX.
A Guard set on the Sports and Diversions of Children 383
SECTION X.
Of the proper Degrees of Liberty and Re- straint in the Education of a Son, illus- trated hy Example ------- 392
SECTION XI.
Of proper Degrees of Liberty and Restraint in the Education of Daughters, illustrated by Examples --------- 401
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE HEAVENS AND EARTH MADE EASY;
OR, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GEOGRAPHY AND ASTRONOMY EXPLAINED BY THE
USE OF GLOBES AND MAPS.
SECTION I.
Of the Spheres or Globes of the Heaven and Earth ---------- 413
SECTION II. Of the greater Circles ------- 414
SECTION III. Of the lesser Circles - - 417
SECTION IV. Of the Points --------- 418
SECTION V.
Of Longitude and Latitude on the earthly Globe, and of different Climates - - - 420
SECTION VI.
Of Right Ascension, Declination, and Hour-Circles -------- 423
SECTION VII.
Of Longitude and Latitude on the heavenly Globe, and of the Nodes and Eclipses of the Planets --------- 425
SECTION VIII.
Of Altitude, Azimuth, Amplitude, and various Risings and Settings of the Sun and Stars ----- 427
SECTION IX.
Of the Inhabitants of the Earth, according to the Positions of the Sphere, the Zones, &c. ..--. 429
SECTION X.
The natural Description of the Earth and Waters, on the Terrestrial Globe - - 433
SECTION XI.
Of Maps and Sea-Charts - - - SECTION XII.
436
The political Divisions of the Earth repre- sented on the Globe ------ 439
SECTION XIII.
Of Europe, and its several Countries and
Kingdoms
439
SECTION XIV.
Of Asia, and its several Countries and Kingdoms ---------- 442
SECTION XV.
Of Africa, and its Divisions ----- 443
SECTION XVI.
Of America, and its Divisions - - - - 444
VI II
CONTENTS.
SECTION XVII.
Of the Fixed S ars on the Heavenly Globe 446
SECTION XVIII.
Of the Planets and Comets ----- 448
SECTION XIX.
Problems relating to Geography and Astro- nomy, to be performed by the Globe - 452
SECTION XX.
Problems relating to Geography and Astro- nomy, to be performed by the Use of the plain Scale and Compasses - - - - 465
SECTION XXI
Tables of the Sun's Declination, and of the Declination and Right Ascension of seve- ral remarkable fixed Stars, together with some Account how they are to be used 488
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS,
Preface 499
ESSAY I.
A fair Inquiry and Debate concerning Space,\vhetherit be something or nothing, God or a Creature? -------
Sect. I. The Subject explained in general
Sect. II. Is Space something, or nothing?
Sect. III. Is Space a Substance? - - -
Sect. IV. Is Space created, or increated ?
Sect. V. Space cannot be God - - -
Sect. VI. A Review and Recollection of
the Argument
Sect. VII. The Original of our Idea of Space, and our Danger of a Mistake - -
Sect. VIII. Space compared to Shadow, or Darkness ---------
Sect. IX. Space inactive and impassive
Sect. X. A Re-examination whether
Space has any real Properties ? - - -
Sect. XI. An Objection against the Ni- hility of Space answered - - - - -
Sect. XII. Space nothing real, but a mere abstract Idea -------
Appendix ---------
503 503 503 504 506 507
510
512
512 514
515
517
519
520
ESSAY II.
Of Substance : And of solid Extension and a thinking Power, as the two only original Substances ----------
Sect. I. Mr. Locke's Notion of Substance considered ---------
Sect. II. The plain Idea or Notion of Substance applied to Mind and Body
521 521
522
ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS.
Sect. III. Considerations to support the Application of the Name of Substance to solid Extension and a thinking Power 524
Sect. IV. The Occasions of Mistake on this Subject 527
ESSAY III.
Of the Original of our Perceptions and Ideas ------------531
ESSAY IV.
Of innate Ideas ---------541
Sect. I. The common Opinion well re- futed by Mr. Locke 541
Sect. II. In what Sense many Ideas are
innate ----------- 542
Sect. III. In what Sense some Truths may be innate --------- 543
Sect. IV. In what Sense some Rules of Duty may be innate ------- 544
Sect. V. Of the Foundations of moral Virtue, and of a moral Sense, or Instinct 545
ESSAY V.
An Inquiry whether the Soul thinks always 549
Sect. I. Considerations toward the Proof of it- - - - 548
Sect. II. Of Dreams, why not remem- bered - - - ------ - - - - 550
Sect. III. Mr. Locke's Objections an- swered ----------- 552
Corollaries ---------- 55"i
CONTENTS.
IX
ESSAY VI.
Of the Tower of Spirits to move Bodies, of their being in a Place, and removing from it----
Sect. I. Of the Power of a Spirit to move Matter ---------
Sect. II. Of Spirits being in a Place, and removing thence --------
Sect. III. The First Objection againstthe Locality of Spirits answered - - - -
Sect. IV. Other Objections answered against the Locality of Spirits - - -
Sect. V. The Ubi, or Whereness, of a Spirit -----_-____
Conclusion -----------
ESSAY VII.
The departing Soul --------
ESSAY VIII.
The Resurrection of the same Body - -
ESSAY IX.
Of the Production, Nourishment, and Ope- rations of Plants and Animals - - -
Sect. I. Creatures produce their own Kind
Sect. II. The Laws of Nature sufficient for the Production of Animals and Vege- tables ------_____
Appendix ----_______
Sect. III. Of the Nourishment and Growth of Plants -----___
Sect. IV. Of the Nourishment and Growth of Animals - - - _ _ _
556
556
561
564
567
569 570
572 576
581 581
583 5S6
589
591
Sect. V. An amusing Digression, con- cerning the Changes of Matter - - -
Sect. VI. The similar Operations of Plants and Animals -------
Sect. VII. Of the Principles of Action in Brutes and Men -------
ESSAY X.
Of Sun-Beams and Star-Beams - - - - Sect. I. Is the Ether beyond our Atmo-
sphere a mere Vacuity ?
Sect. II. Doth the World grow bigger or less ?---.---_-__
ESSAY XI.
On some metaphysical Subjects - - - -
Sect. I. Of Nature and Essence - - -
Sect. II. Of Matter and Form - - -
Sect. III. Of the different Senses of the Word Nature -----__.-
Sect. IV. Of Creation or Conservation - ESSAY XII.
Remarks on some Chapters of Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding - 615
Sect. 1. Of sensible Qualities, and parti- cularly of Colour --------
594 597 599
603 603
605
60S 608 610
612 613
Sect. II. Of Succession and Duration -
Sect. III. Of Infinity
Sect. IV. Of Power.— Book II. Chapter
xxi. i .
Sect. V. Whether Liberty can be ascri- bed to the Will ? - -
Sect. VI. Of complex Ideas and mixed Modes
Sect. VII. Of Identity and Diversity -
615 616 617
618 619
620 622
A BRIEF SCHEME OF ONTOLOGY;
OR, THE SCIENCE OF BEING IN GENERAL.
CHAPTER I.
Of Being and Not-Being, with a general Scheme of the Affections of Being - - (335
CHAPTER II.
Of Essence or Nature, Matter and Form - 636
VOL. V.
CHAPTER III. Of Existence, whether actual, possible or impossible, necessary or contingent, de- pendent or independent ------
CHAPTER IV.
Of Duration, Creation, and Conservation - b
638
640
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER V. Of Unity and Union 641
CHAPTER VI.
Of Act and Power, Action and Passion, Ne- cessity and Liberty ------- 642
CHAPTER VII. Of relative Affections or Relations -
CHAPTER VIII. Of Truth, Goodness, and Perfection
CHAPTER IX. Of the Whole and Parts - - - -
CHAPTER X. Of Principles, Causes, and Effects
CHAPTER XI. Of Subject and Adjunct - - - -
- 645
646
648
649
656
CHAPTER XII.
Of Time, Place, and Ubiety - - - - 657
CHAPTER XIII.
Of Agreement and Difference ; of Same- ness, and the Doctrine of Opposites - - 658
CHAPTER XIV.
Of Number and Order - ----- 662
CHAPTER XV.
Of mental Relations, viz. Abstract Notions, Signs, Words, Terms of Art, &c. - - 662
CHAPTER XVI.
The chief Kinds or Divisions of Being, and first of Substance and Mode - - - 665
CHAPTER XVII.
Of Finite and Infinite - - - CHAPTER XVIII.
666
Of natural, moral, and artificial Beings and Ideas ---------- 667
THE RATIONAL FOUNDATION OF A CHRISTIAN CHURCH, AND THE TERMS OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNION.
TO WHICH ARE ADDED THREE DISCOURSES.
SECTION I.
Reason and Revelation agree to require social Religion -------- 673
SECTION II.
Instances of the Agreement of Reason and Revelation in social Religion - - - - 676
SECTION III.
A brief Inquiry how far the Modes of the Mission, or Ordination of primitive Mi- nisters are our Rule now? ----- 685
SECTION IV.
The Rest of the Instances wherein Reason and Revelation agree in Matters of so-
cial Worship
689
SECTION V.
W here Revelation is silent, Reason must direct - 691
SECTION VI.
Christian Churches formed like civil So- cieties, upon the plain Nature and Reason of Things --------_-
SECTION VII.
The several Advantages of such a Church, or christian Society - - - - - -
SECTION VIII.
roi
"03
Of the Power of Churches to appoint holy
Things or Actions ------- 706
The Terms of Christian Communion - - 711
QUESTION I.
What is christian Communion ; and what are the general and agreed Terms of it? 711
QUESTION II.
Who arc the proper Judges of the Credi- bility of our Profession ? ----- 713
CONTENTS.
XI
QUESTION III.
What are the particular Terms of christian Communion ? or, What Things are ne- cessary to make the Profession of Chris- tianity credible ?-------- 720
QUESTION IV.
What is a Church Covenant ? and Whether it be necessary to christian Communion ? 727
QUESTION V.
When a Person is once joined to a parti- cular Church, whether he may never worship with other Churches occasion- ally, or change his fixed Communion to another Church? - ------- 730
QUESTION VI.
Whether fixed Communion with some particular Church be a necessary Duty ? and Whether any may be admitted to occasional Communion, who are no fixed Members of any Church ? - ... 731
QUESTION VII.
What Knowledge is necessary for christian Communion? --------- 734
QUESTION VIII.
In what Words and Expressions must our Faith be professed, in order to Commu- nion ? and In what manner must we pro- fess it ? 739
QUESTION IX.
Where the Seclusion from christian Com- munion carries temporal lnconveniencies with it, hath a particular Church the Power to seclude a Person merely for Want of Orthodoxy ?------ 744
QUESTION X.
Whether a Profession to believe the express Words of Scripture, without any Expli- cation, be an Evidence of Knowledge sufficient for christian Communion ? - - 746
QUESTION XL
Whether all Sorts of Protestants may join together as Members of the same Church ? 76l
QUESTION XII.
Whether no Christians must join in the same Communion but those that are in all Things of the same Opinion ? - - - 768
DISCOURSE I.
A Pattern for a dissenting Preacher, John vii. 46. ----------- 773
DISCOURSE II.
A Sermon preached at the Separation of Two Deacons to their Office, 1 Tim. iii. 13. 785
DISCOURSE III.
Invitations to Church-Fellowship, Psalm Ixv. 4.
794
LOGICK:
OR,
THE RIGHT USE OF REASON
IN THE
ENQUIRY AFTER TRUTH.
WITH
A VARIETY OF RULES TO GUARD AGAINST ERROR IN THE AFFAIRS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN LIFE, AS WELL AS IN THE SCIENCES.
VOL. V.
TO
SIR JOHN HARTOPP, BART
SIR,
XT is fit the public should receive through your hands what was written originally for the assistance of your younger studies, and was then presented to you.
It was by the repeated importunities of our learned friend Mr. John Eames, that I was persuaded to revise these Rudiments of Logick, and when I had once suffered myself to begin the work, I was drawn still onward, far beyond my first design, even to the neglect, or too long delay, of other pressing and important demands that were upon me.
It has been my endeavour to form every part of this Treatise both for the instruction of students, to open their way into the sciences, and for the more extensive and general service of mankind, that the gentleman and the christian might find their account in the perusal, as well as the scholar. I have therefore collected and proposed the chief principles and rules of right judgment in matters of common autl sacred importance, and pointed out our most frequent mistakes and prejudices in the concerns of life and religion, that we might better guard against the springs of error, guilt and sorrow, which surround us in every state of mortality.
You know, Sir, the great design of this noble science is to rescue our reasoning powers from their unhappy slavery and darkness ; and thus, with all due submission and deference, it offers an humble assistance to divine revelation. Its chief business is to relieve the natural weaknesses of the mind, by some better efforts of nature : It is to diffuse a light over the understanding in our enquiries after truth, and not to furnish the tongue with debate and controversy. True Logick is not that noisy thing that deals all in dispute and wrangling, to which former ages had debased and confined it ; yet its disciples must acknowledge also, that they are taught to vindicate and defend the truth, as well as to search it out. True Logick doth not require a long detail of hard words to amuse mankind, and to puff up the mind with empty sounds, and a pride of false learning \ yet some distinctions and terms of art are necessary to range
b 2
4 DEDICATION.
every idea in its proper class, and to keep our thoughts from confusion. The world is now grown so wise, as not to suffer this valuable art to be engrossed by the schools : In so polite and knowing an age, every man of reason will covet some acquaintance with Logick, since it renders its daily service to wisdom and virtue, and to the affairs of common life as well as to the sciences.
I will not presume, Sir, that this little Book is improved since its first composure, in proportion to the improvements of your manly age. But when you shall please to review it in your retired hours, perhaps you may refresh your own memory in some of the early parts of learning. And if you find all the additional Remarks and Rules made so familiar to you already by your own observation, that there is nothing new among them, it will be no unpleasing reflection that you have so far anticipated the present zeal and labour of,
SIR,
Your most faithful
and obedient Servant,
I. WATTS,
London, Aug. 24, 1721.
LOGICK :
OR,
THE RIGHT USE OF REASON.
THE INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL SCHEME.
JLfOGICK is the art of using Reason* well in our enquiries after truth, and the communication of it to others.
Reason* is the glory of human nature, and one of the chief eminences whereby we are raised above our fellow-creatures, the brutes, in this lower world.
Reason, as to the power and principle of it, is the common gift of God to all men ; though all are not favoured with it by nature in an equal degree : But the acquired improvement of it in different men, makes a much greater distinction between them than nature had made. I could even venture to say, that the improvement of reason hath raised the learned and the prudent in the European world, almost as much above the Hottentots, and other savages of Africa, as those savages are by nature superior to the birds, the beasts, and the fishes.
Now the design of Logick is to teach us the right use of our reason, or intellectual powers, and the improvement of them in ourselves and others : This is not only neces- sary in order to attain any competent knowledge in the sciences, or the affairs of learning, but to govern both the greater and the meaner actions of life. It is the cultivation of our reason by which we are better enabled to distinguish good from evil, as well as truth from falsehood : And both these are matters of the highest importance, whether we regard this life, or the life to come.
The pursuit and acquisition of truth is of infinite concernment to mankind. Hereby we become acquainted with the nature of things both in heaven and earth, and their various relations to each other. It is by this means we discover our duty to God and
* The word reason in this place is not confined to the mere faculty of reasoning, or inferring one thing froia another,, but includes all the intellectual powers of man.
LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON.
our fellow-creatures : By this we arrive at the knowledge of natural religion, and learn to confirm our faith in divine revelation, as well as to understand what is revealed. Our wisdom, prudence and piety, our present conduct and our future hope, are all influenced by the use of our rational powers in the search after truth.
There are several things that make it very necessary that our reason should have some assistance in the exercise or use of it.
The first is, the depth and difficulty of many truths, and the weakness of our reason to see far into things at once, and penetrate to the bottom of them. It was a saying among the ancients, Veritas in puleo, " Truth lies in a well ;" and, to carry on this metaphor, we may very justly say, that Logick does, as it were, supply us with steps whereby we may go down to reach the water ; or it frames the links of a chain, whereby we may draw the water up from the bottom. Thus by the means of many reasonings well connected together, philosophers in our age have drawn a thousand truths out of the depths of darkness, which our fathers were utterly unacquainted with.
Another thing that makes it necessary for our reason to have some assistance given it, is the disguise and false colours in which many things appear to us in this present imperfect state. There are a thousand things which are not in reality what they appear to be, and that both in the natural and the moral world : So the sun appears to be flat as a plate of silver, and to be less than twelve inches in diameter: The moon appears to be as big as the sun, and the rainbow appears to be a large substantial arch in the sky ; all which are in reality gross falsehoods. So knavery puts on the face of justice, hypocrisy and superstition wear the vizard of piety, deceit and evil are often clothed in the shapes and appearances of truth and goodness. Now Logick helps us to strip off the outward disguise of things, and to behold them, and judge of them in their own nature.
There is yet a farther proof that our intellectual or rational powers need some assistance, and that is, because they are so frail and fallible in the present state ; we are imposed upon at home as well as abroad ; we are deceived by our senses, by our imaginations, by our passions and appetites, by the authority of men, by education and custom, &c. and we are led into frequent errors, by judging according to these false and flattering principles, rather than according to the nature of things. Something of this frailty is owing to our very constitution, man being compounded of flesh and spirit ; something of it arises from our infant state, and our growing up by small degrees to manhood, so that we form a thousand judgments before our reason is mature. But there is still more of it owing to our original defection from God, and the foolish and evil dispositions that are found in fallen man : So that one great part of the design of Logick is to guard us against the delusive influences of our meaner powers, to cure the mistakes of immature judgment, and to raise us in some measure from the ruins of our fall.
It is evident enough from all these things, that our reason needs the assistance of art in our enquiries after truth or duty ; and without some skill and diligence in forming
LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON.
our judgments aright, we shall be led into frequent mistakes, both in matters of science and in matters of practice, and some of these mistakes may prove fatal too.
The art of Logick, even as it assists us to gain the knowledge of the sciences, leads us on towards virtue and happiness : For all our speculative acquaintance with things should be made subservient to our better conduct in the civil and the religious life. This is infinitely more valuable than all speculations ; and a wise man will use them chiefly for this better purpose.
All the good judgment and prudence that any man exerts in his common concerns of life, without the advantage of learning, is called natural Logick; and it is but a higher advancement, and a farther assistance of our rational powers, that is designed by and expected from this artificial Logick.
In order to attain this, we must enquire what are the principal operations of the mind, which are put forth in the exercise of our reason ; and we shall find them to be these four, namely, Perception, Judgment, Argumentation and Disposition.
Now the art of Logick is composed of those observations and rules, which men have made about these four operations of the mind, perception, judgment, reasoning, and disposition, in order to assist and improve them.
I. Perception, conception, or apprehension, is the mere simple contemplation of things offered to our minds, without affirming or denying any thing concerning them. So we conceive or think of a horse, a tree, high, swift, slow, animal, time, motion, matter, mind, life, death, &c. The form under which these things appear to the mind, or the result of our conception or apprehension is called an idea.
II. Judgment is that operation of the mind, whereby we join two or more ideas together by one affirmation or negation ; that is, we either affirm or deny this to be that. So, this tree is high ; that horse is not swift ; the mind of man is a thinking being ; mere matter has no thought belonging to it; God is just; good men are often miserable in this world ; a righteous governor will make a difference betwixt the evil and the good ; which sentences are the effect of judgment, and are called propositions.
III. Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of the mind, whereby we infer one thing, that is, one proposition, from two or more propositions premised. Or it is the drawing a conclusion, which before was either unknown, or dark, or doubtful, from some propositions which are more known and evident. So when we have judged that matter cannot think, and that the mind of man doth think, we then infer and conclude, that therefore the mind of man is not matter.
So we judge that a just governor will make a difference between the evil and the good; we judge also that God is a just governor ; and from thence we conclude, that God will make a difference between the evil and the good.
This argumentation may be carried on farther, thus, God will one time or another make a difference between the good and the evil ; but there is little or no difference made in this world 5 therefore there must be another world wherein this difference shall be made.
LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON.
These inferences or conclusions are the effects of reasoning, and the three proposi- tions taken all together are called a syllogism or argument.
IV. Disposition is that operation of the mind, whereby we put the ideas, propositions and arguments, which we have formed concerning one subject, into such an order as is fittest to gain the clearest knowledge of it, to retain it longest, and to explain it to others in the best manner : Or, in short, it is the ranging of our thoughts in such order, as is best for our own and others conception and memory. The effect of this operation is called method. This very description of the four operations of the mind and their effects, in this order, is an instance or example of method.
Now as the art of Logick assists our conceptions, so it gives us a large and compre- hensive view of the subjects we enquire into, as well as a clear and distinct knowledge of them. As it regulates our judgment and our reasoning, so it secures us from mistakes, and gives us a true and certain knowledge of things ; and as it furnishes us with method, so it makes our knowledge of things both easy and regular, and guards our thoughts from confusion.
Logick is divided into four parts, according to these four operations of the mind, which it directs, and therefore we shall treat of it in this order.
LOGICK.
THE FIRST PART.
OF PERCEPTION AND IDEAS.
J. HE first part of Logick contains observations and precepts about the first operation of the mind, perception or conception : And since all our knowledge, how wide and large soever it grows, is founded upon our conceptions and ideas, here we shall consider,
1. The general nature of them.
2. The objects of our conception, or the archetypes or patterns of these ideas.
3. The several divisions of them.
4. The words and terms whereby our ideas are expressed.
5. General directions about our ideas.
6. Special rules to direct our conceptions.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE NATURE OF IDEAS.
JT IRST, the nature of conception or perception * shall just be mentioned, though this may seem to belong to another science rather than Logick.
Perception is that act of the mind, or, as some philosophers call it, rather a passion or impression, whereby the mind becomes conscious of any thing. As when I feel hunger, thirst, or cold, or heat; when I see a horse, a tree, or a man ; when I hear a human voice, or thunder, I am conscious of these things, and this is called perception. If I study, meditate, wish, or fear, I am conscious of these inward acts also, and my mind perceives its own thoughts, wishes, fears, &c.
An idea is generally defined a representation of a thing in the mind ; it is a representa- tion of something that we have seen, felt, heard, &c. or been conscious of. That notion
* Note, The words conception and perception are often used promiscuously, as I have done here, because I woul I not embarrass a learner with too many distinctions; but if I were to distinguish them, I would say, perception is the eonsciousness of an object when present ; conception is the forming au idea of the object whether present or absent. VOL. V. C
10 LOGICK; OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Pakt 1.
or form of a horse, a tree, or a man, which is in the mind, is called the idea of a horse, a tree, or a man.
That notion of hunger, cold, sound, colour, thought, or wish, or fear, which is in the mind, is called the idea of hunger, cold, sound, wish, &c.
It is not the outward object, or thing which is perceived, namely, the horse, the man, &c. nor is it the very perception or sense and feeling, namely, of hunger, or cold, &c. which is called the idea ; but it is the thing as it exists in the mind by way of con- ception, or representation, that is properly called the idea, whether the object be present or absent.
As a horse, a man, a tree, are the outward objects of our perception, and the outward archetypes or patterns of our ideas ; so our own sensations of hunger, cold, &c. are also inward archetypes, or patterns of our ideas : But the notions or pictures of these things, as they are considered, or conceived in the mind, are precisely the ideas that we have to do with in Logick. To see a horse, or to feel cold, is one thing ; to think of, and con- verse about a man, a horse, hunger, or cold, is another.
Among all these ideas, such as represent bodies, are generally called images, espe- cially if the idea of shape be included. Those inward representations which we have of spirit, thought, love, hatred, cause, effect, &c. are more pure and mental ideas, belonging more especially to the mind, and carry nothing of shape or sense in them. — But I shall have occasion to speak more particularly of the original and distinction of ideas in the third chapter. I proceed therefore now to consider the objects of our ideas.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.
SECTION I.
OF BEING IN GENERAL.
A HE object of perception is that which is represented in the idea, that which is the archetype or pattern, according to which the idea is formed : And thus judgments, pro- positions, reasons, and long discourses, may all become the objects of perception ; but in this place we speak chiefly of the first and more simple objects of it, before they are joined and formed into propositions or discourses.
Every object of our idea is called a theme, whether it be a being or not-being, for not- being may be proposed to our thoughts, as well as that which has a real being. But let us first treat of beings, and that in the largest extent of the word. A being is considered as possible, or as actual.
When it is considered as possible, it is said to have an essence or nature ; such were all things before their creation : When it is considered as actual, then it is said to have existence also ; such are all things which are created, and God himself the Creator.
Essence therefore is but the very nature of any being, whether it be actually existing or no. A rose in winter has an essence, in summer it has existence also.
Chap. 2. LOGICK : OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 11
Note, There is but one being which includes existence in the very essence of it, and that is God, who therefore actually exists by natural and eternal necessity : But the actual existence of every creature is very distinct from its essence, for it may be, or may not be, as God pleases.
Again, Every being is considered either as subsisting in and by itself, and then it is called a substance; or it subsists in and by another, and then it is called a mode or manner of being. Though few writers allow mode to be called a being in the same perfect sense as a substance is ; and some modes have evidently more of real entity or being, than others, as will appear when we come to treat of them. These things will furnish us with matter for larger discourse in the following sections.
SECTION II.
OF SUBSTANCES, AND THEIR VARIOUS KINDS.
A substance is a being which can subsist by itself without dependence upon any other created being. The notion of subsisting by itself gives occasion to logicians to call it a substance. So a horse, a house, wood, stone, water, fire, a spirit, a body, an angel, are called substances, because they depend on nothing but God for their existence.
It has been usual also in the description of substance to add, it is that which is the subject of modes or accidents; a body is the substance or subject, its shape is the mode.
But lest we be led into mistakes, let us here take notice, that when a substance is said to subsist without dependence upon another created being, all that we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utterly destroyed and reduced to nothing, by any power inferior to that of our Creator ; though its present particular form, nature and properties may be altered and destroyed by many inferior causes ; a horse may die and turn to dust ; wood may be turned into fire, smoke, and ashes ; a house into rubbish, and water into ice or vapour ; but the substance or matter of which they are made still remains, though the forms and shapes of it are altered. A body may cease to be a house, or a horse, but it is a body still ; and in this sense it depends only upon God for its existence.
Among substances some are thinking or conscious beings, or have a power of thought, such as the mind of man, God, angels. Some are extended and solid, or impenetrable ; that is, they have dimensions of length, breadth and depth, and have also a power of resistance, or exclude every thing of the same kind from being in the same place. This is the proper character of matter or body.
As for the idea of space, whether it be void or full, that is, a vacuum or a plenum, whether it be interspersed among all bodies, or may be supposed to reach beyond the bounds of the creation, it is an argument too long and too hard to be disputed in this place what the nature of it is : It has been much debated whether it be a real substance, or a mere conception of the mind, whether it be the immensity of the divine nature, or the mere order of co-existent beings, whether it be the manner of our conception of the distances of bodies, or a mere nothing. Therefore I drop the mention of it here, and refer the reader to the first essay among the Philosophical Essays, by I, W. published 1733.
c 2
12 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part t.
Now, if we seclude space out of our consideration, there will remain but two sorts of substances in the world, that is, matter and miud; or, as we otherwise call them, body and spirit ; at least we have no ideas of any other substance but these.*
Among substances some are called simple, some are compound, whether the words be taken in a philosophical or a vulgar sense.
Simple substances, in a philosophical sense, are either spirits, which have no manner of composition in them, and in this sense God is called a simple being; or they are the first principles of bodies, which are usually called elements, of which all other bodies are compounded : Elements are such substances as cannot be resolved or reduced into two or more substances of different kinds.
The various sects of philosophers have attributed the honour of this name to various things. The peripateticks, or followers of Aristotle, made fire, air, earth, and water, to be the four elements, of which all earthly things were compounded ; and they supposed the heavens to be a quintessence, or fifth sort of body, distinct from all these; but since experimental philosophy and mathematics have been better understood, this doc- trine has been abundantly refuted. The chemists make spirit, salt, sulphur, water, and earth, to be their five elements, because they can reduce all terrestrial things to these five: This seems to come nearer the truth ; though they are not all agreed in this enumeration of elements. In short, our modern philosophers generally suppose matter or body to be
* Because men have different ideas and notions of substance, I thought it not proper entirely to omit all accounts of them, and therefore have thrown them into the margin.
Some philosophers suppose that our acquaintance with matter or mind reaches no farther than the mere properties of them, and that there is a sort of unknown being, which is the substance ©r the subject by which these properties of jtolid extension and of cogitation are supported, and in which these properties inhere or exist. But perhaps this notion rises only from our turning the mere abstracted or logical notion of substance or self-subsisting into the notion of a distinct physical or natural being without any necessity. Solid extension seems to me to be the very substance of matter, or of all bodies ; and a power of thinking, which is always in act, seems to be the very substance of all spirits ; for God himself is an intelligent, almighty power; nor is there any need to seek for any other secret and unknown being, or abstracted substance entirely distinct from these, in order to support the several modes or properties of matter or mind, for these two ideas are sufficient for that purpose; therefore I rather think these are substances.
It must be confessed, when we say, spirit is a thinking substance, and matter is an extended solid substance, we are sometimes ready to imagine that extension and solidity are but mere modes and properties of a certain unknown sub- stance or subject which supports them, and which we call body; and that a power of thinking is but a mere mode and property of some unknown substance or subject which supports it, and which we call spirit : But 1 rather take this to be a mere mistake, which we are led into by the grammatical form and use of words ; and perhaps our logical way of think- ing by substances and modes, as well as our grammatical way of talking by substantives and adjectives, help to delude us into the supposition.
However, that I may not be wanting to any of my readers, I would let them know Mr. Locke's opinion, which has obtained much in the present age, and it is this : " That our idea of any particular substance is only such a combina- tion of simple ideas as represents that thing as subsisting by itself, in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always ready to offer itself. It is a conjunction of ideas co-existing in such a cause of their union, and makes the whole subject subsist by itself, though the cause of their union be unknown ; and our general idea of sub- stance arises from the self-subsistence of this collection of ideas."
Now, if this notion of substance rest here, and be considered merely as an unknown cause of the union of properties, it is much more easy to be admitted ; but if we proceed to support a sort of real, substantial, distinct being, different from solid quantity or extension in bodies, and different from a power of thinking in spirits, in my opinion it is the intro- duction of a needless scholastical notion into the real nature of tilings, and then fancying it to have a real existence.
Mr. Locke in his Essay of Human Understanding Book 11. Chap. 22. § 2. seems to ridicule this common idea of substance, which men have generally supposed to be a sort of substratum distinct from all properties whatsoever, and to be the support of all properties. Yet, in Book IV. Chap. 3. § 0'. he seems to suppose there may be some such unknown substratum, which may be capable of receiving the properties both of matter and mind, namely, extension, solidity, and cogitation; for he supposes it possible for God to add cogitation to that substance which is corporeal, and thus to cause matter to think. If this be true, then spirits, for ought we know, maybe corporeal beings, or think- ing bodies, which is a doctrine too favourable to the mortality of the soul. But I leave these debates to the philoso- phers of the age, and will not be too positive in my opinion of this abstruse subject. See more of this argument in Philosophical Essays, before cited, Essay 2.
Chap. C. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 13
one simple principle, or solid extension, which being diversified by its various shapes, quantities, motions, and situations, makes all the varieties that are found in the universe; and therefore they make little use of the word element.
Compound substances are made up of two or more simple substances ; so every thing in this whole material creation, that can be reduced by the art of man into two or more different principles or substances, is a compound body in the philosophical sense.
But, if we take the words simple and compound in a vulgar sense, then all those are simple substances, which are generally esteemed uniform in their natures. So every herb is called a simple, and every metal and mineral ; though the chemist perhaps may find all his several elements in each of them. So a needle is a simple body, being only made of steel ; but a sword or a knife is a compound, because its haft or handle is made of materials different from the blade. So the bark of Peru, or the juice of sorrel, is a simple medicine ; but when the apothecaries' art has mingled several simples together, it becomes a compound, as diascordium or mithridate.
The terms of pure and mixed, when applied to bodies, are much akin to simple and compound. So a guinea is pure gold, if it has nothing but gold in it, without any alloy, or baser metal ; but if any other mineral or metal be mingled with it, it is called a mixed substance or body.
Substances are also divided into animate and inanimate. Animated substances are either animal or vegetable.*
Some of the animated substances have various organical or instrumental parts fitted for a variety of motions from place to place, and a spring of life within themselves, as beasts, birds, fishes, and insects ; these are called animals. Other animated substances are called vegetables, which have within themselves the principles of another sort of life and growth, and of various productions of leaves, flowers and fruit, such as we see in plants, herbs and trees.
And there are other substances, which are called inanimate, because they have no sort of life in them, as earth, stone, air, water, &c.
There is also one sort of substance or being, which is compounded of body and mind, or a rational spirit united to an animal ; such is mankind. Angels, or any other beings of the spiritual and invisible world, who have assumed visible shapes for a season, can hardly be reckoned among this order of compounded beings, because they drop their bodies, and divest themselves of those visible shapes when their particular message is performed, and thereby shew that these bodies do not belong to their natures.
SECTION III.
OF MODES IN THEIR VARIOUS KINDS, AND FIRST OF ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL
MODES.
A HE next sort of objects which are represented in our ideas, are called modes or manners of being.f
* Note, Vegetables, as well as animals, have gotten the name of animated substances, because some of the ancients supposed herbs and plants, beasts, birds, &c to have a sort of souls distinct from matter or body.
t Note, The term mode is by some authors applied chiefly to the relations or relative manners of being. But in logical treatises it is often used in a larger sense, and extends to all attributes whatsoever, aud includes the most essential and inward properties, as well as outward respects and relations, and reaches to actions themselves as well as manners of actions.
14 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part i.
A mode is that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to, and subsisting by the help of some substance, which, for that reason, is called its subject. A mode must depend on that substance for its very existence and being ; and that not as a being depends on its cause, for so substances themselves depend on God their Creator; but the very being of a mode depends on some substance for its subject, in which it is, or to which it belongs ; so motion, shape, quantity, weight, are modes of body; knowledge, wit, folly, love, doubting, judging, are modes of the mind ; for the one cannot subsist without body, and the other cannot subsist without mind.
Modes have their several divisions, as well as substances.
I. Modes are either essential or accidental.
An essential mode or attribute, is that which belongs to the very nature or essence of the subject wherein it is; and the subject can never have the same nature without it; such is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a stone, softness in water, vital motion in an animal, solidity in matter, thinking in a spirit ; for though that piece of wood which is now a bowl may be made square, yet if roundness be taken away, it is no longer a bowl : So that very flesh and bones, which is now an animal, may be without life or inward motion ; but if all motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an animal, but a car- case : So, if a body of matter be divested of solidity, it is a mere void space or nothing ; and if spirit be entirely without thinking, I have no idea of any thing that is left in it; therefore, so far as I am able to judge, consciousness must be its essential attribute:* Thus all the perfections of God are called his attributes, for he cannot be without them.
An essential mode is either primary or secondary.
A primary essential mode is the first, or chief thing that constitutes any being in its particular essence or nature, and makes it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it from all other beings : This is called the difference in the definition of things, of which hereafter : So roundness is the primary essential mode, or the difference of a bowl : The meeting of two lines is the primary essential mode, or the difference of an angle: The perpendicularity of these lines to each other is the difference of a right angle : Solid extension is the primary attribute, or difference of matter: Consciousness, or at least a power of thinking, is the difference or primary attribute of a spirit;! and to fear and love God, is the primary attribute of a pious man.
A secondary essential mode is any other attribute of a thing, which is not of primary consideration : This is called a property : Sometimes indeed it goes toward making up the essence, especially of a complex being, so {far as we are acquainted with it; some- times it depends upon, and follows from the essence of it ; so volubility, or aptness to roll, is the property of a bowl, and is derived from its roundness. Mobility and figure or shape are properties of matter; and it is the property of a pious man to love his neighbour.
An accidental mode, or an accident, is such a mode as is not necessary to the being of a thing, for the subject may be without it, and yet remain of the same nature that it
* Note, When I call solid extension an essential mode or attribute of matter, and a power of thinking an essential mode or attribute of a spirit, I do it in compliance with common forms of speech ; but perhaps in reality these are the very essences or substances themselves, and the most substantial ideas that we can frame of body and spirit, and have bo need of any, we know not what, substratum or unintelligible substance to support them in their existence or being.
t See the note in the foregoing and this page.
Chap. 2. LOGTCK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 15
was before; or, it is that mode which may be separated or abolished from its subject; so smoothness or roughness, blackness or whiteness, motion or rest, are the accidents of a bowl ; for these may be all changed, and yet the body remain a bowl still : Learning justice, folly, sickness, health, are the accidents of a man : Motion, squareness, or any particular shape or size, are the accidents of body ; yet shape and size in general are essential modes of it ; for a body must have some size and shape, nor can it be without them : So hope, fear, wishing, assenting, and doubting, are accidents of the mind, though thinking in general seems to be essential to it.
Here observe, that the name of accident has been oftentimes given by the old peri- patetick philosophers to all modes, whether essential or accidental ; but the moderns confine this word accident to the sense in which I have described it.
Here it should be noted also, that though the word property be limited sometimes in logical treatises fo the secondary essential mode, yet it is used in common language to signify these four sorts of modes ; of which some are essential, and some accidental .
1. Such as belong to every subject of that kind, but not only [to those subjects. So yellow colour and ductility are properties of gold, they belong to all gold, but not only to gold ; for saffron is also yellow, and lead is ductile.
2. Such as belong only to one kind of subject, but not to every subject of that kind. So learning, reading and writing, are properties of human nature; they belong only to man, but not to all men.
3. Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and only to them, but not always. So speech or language is a property of man, for it belongs to all men, and. to men only ; but men are not always speaking.
4. Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and to them only and always. So shape and divisibility are properties of body ; so omniscience and omnipotence are properties of the divine nature ; for in this sense properties and attributes are the same, and except in logical treatises there is scarce any distinction made between them. These are called propria quarto modo in the schools, or properties of the fourth sort.
Note, Where there is any one property or essential attribute, so superior to the rest, that it appears plainly that all the rest are derived from it, and such as is sufficient to give a full distinction of that subject from all other subjects, this attribute or property is called the essential difference, as is before declared; and we commonly say the essence of the thing consists in it ; so the essence of matter in general seems to consist in solidity or solid extension. But for the most part we are so much at a loss in finding out the intimate essence of particular natural bodies, that we are forced to distinguish the essential difference of most things by a combination of properties. So a sparrow is a bird which has such coloured feathers, and such a particular size, shape, and motion. So wormwood is an herb which has such a leaf of such a colour, and shape, and taste, and such a root and stalk. So beasts and fishes, minerals, metals, and works of art sometimes, as well as of nature, are distinguished by such a collection of properties.
16 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part. 1.
SECTION IV.
THE FURTHER DIVISIONS OF MODE.
II. The second division of modes is into absolute and relative. An absolute mode is that which belongs to its subject, without respect to any other beings whatsoever ; but a relative mode is derived from the regard that one being has to others. So round- ness and smoothness are the absolute modes of a bowl ; for if there were nothing else existing in the whole creation, a bowl might be round and smooth ; but greatness and smallness are relative modes ; for the very ideas of them are derived merely from the comparison of one being with others ; a bowl of four inches diameter is very great, compared with one of an inch and a half; but it is very small in comparison of another bowl, whose diameter is eighteen or twenty inches. Motion is the absolute mode of a body, but swiftness or slowness are relative ideas ; for the motion of a bowl on a bowl- ing-green, is swift, when compared with a snail ; and it is slow, when compared with a cannon bullet.
These relative modes are largely treated of by some logical and metaphysical writers under the name of relation : And these relations themselves are farther subdivided into such as arise from the nature of things, and such as arise merely from the operation of our minds ; one sort are called real relations, the other mental ; so the likeness of one egg to another, is a real relation, because it arises from the real nature of things ; for whether there was any man or mind to conceive it or no, one egg would be like another : But when we consider an egg as a noun substantive in grammar, or as signified by the letters e, g, g, these are mere mental relations, and derive their very nature from the mind of man. These sort of relations are called by the schools entia rationis, or second notions, which have no real being, but depend entirely on the operation of the mind.
III. The third division of mode shews us, they are either intrinsical or extrinsical. Intrinsical modes are conceived to be in the subject or substance, as when we say, a globe is round, swift, or rolling, or at rest : Or when we say, a man is tall or learned, these are intrinsic modes : But extrinsic modes are such as arise from something that is not in the subject or substance itself; but it is a manner of being, which some substances attain by reason of something that is external or foreign to the subject; as, this globe lies within two yards of the wall; or this man is beloved or hated. Note, such sort of modes as this last example, are called external denominations.
IV. There is a fourth division much akin to this, whereby modes are said to be inherent or adherent, that is, proper or improper. Adherent or improper modes arise from the joining of some accidental substance to the chief subject, which yet may be separated from it ; so when a bowl is wet, or a boy is clothed, these are adherent modes; for the water and the clothes are distinct substances, which adhere to the bowl or to the boy : But when we say, the bowl is swift or round ; when we say the boy is strong or witty, these are proper or inherent modes, for they have a sort of in-being in the substance itself, and do not arise from the addition of any other substance to it.
V. Action and passion are modes or manners which belong to substances, and should not entirely be omitted here. When a smith with a hammer strikes a piece
Chap. 2. LOGTCK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 17
of iron, the hammer and the smith are both agents, or subjects of action; the one is the prime or supreme, the other the subordinate : The iron is the patient, or the subject of passion in a philosophical sense, because it receives the operation of the agent ; though this sense of the words passion and patient differs much from the vulgar meaning of them.*
VI. The sixth division of modes may be into physical (t. e. natural), civil, moral, and supernatural. So when we consider the apostle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or honesty, and an inspired apostle; his low stature is a physical mode, his being a Roman is a civil privilege, his honesty is a moral consideration, and his being inspired is supernatural.
VII. Modes belong either to body or to spirit, or to both. Modes of body belong only to matter or to corporeal beings ; and these are shape, size, situation, or place, &c. Modes of spirit belong only to minds ; such are knowledge, assent, dissent, doubting, reasoning, &c. Modes which belong to both have been sometimes called mixed modes, or human modes, for these are only found in human nature, which is compounded both of body and spirit; such are sensation, imagination, passion, &c. in all which there is a concurrence of the operations both of mind and body, that is, of animal and intellectual nature.
But the modes of body may be yet farther distinguished. Some of them are primary modes or qualities, for they belong to bodies considered in themselves, whether there were any man to take notice of them or no ; such are those before-mentioned, namely, shape, size, situation, &c. Secondary qualities, or modes, are such ideas as we ascribe to bodies on account of the various impressions which are made on the senses of men by them, and these are called sensible qualities, which are very numerous ; such are all colours, as red, green, blue, &c. such are all sounds, as sharp, shrill, loud, hoarse ; all tastes, as sweet, bitter, sour; all smells, whether pleasant, offensive, or indifferent; and all tactile qualities, or such as affect the touch or feeling, namely, heat, cold, &c. These are properly called secondary qualities, for though we are ready to con- ceive them as existing in the very bodies themselves which affect our senses, yet true philosophy has most undeniably proved, that all these are really various ideas or perceptions excited in human nature, by the different impressions that bodies make upon our senses by their primary modes, that is, by means of the different shape, size, motion, and position, of those little invisible parts that compose them. Thence it follows, that a secondary quality, considered as in the bodies themselves, is nothing else but a power or aptitude to produce such sensations in us : See Locke's Essay of the Understanding, Book II. Chap. 8.
VIII. I might add, in the last place, that as modes belong to substances, so there are some also that are but modes of other modes ; for though they subsist in and by the substance, as the original subject of them, yet they are properly and directly attri- buted to some mode of that substance. Motion is the mode of a body ; but the swiftness or slowness of it, or its direction to the North or South, are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or manner of a man, or of a beast ; but walking grace-
* Note, Agent signifies the doer, patient the sufferer, action is doing, passion is suffering : Agent and action have retained their original and philosophical sense, though patient and passion have acquired a very different meaning iu common language.
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fully implies a manner or mode superadded to that action. All comparative and superlative degrees of any quality, are the modes of a mode, as swifter implies a greater measure of swiftness.
It would be too tedious here to run through all the modes, accidents, and relations at large that belong to various beings, and are copiously treated of in general in the science called metaphysicks, or more properly ontology : They are also treated of in particular in those sciences which have assumed them severally as their proper subjects.
SECTION V.
OF THE TEN CATEGORIES. — OF SUBSTANCE MODIFIED.
We have thus given an account of the two chief objects of our ideas, namely, sub- stances and modes, and their various kinds : And in these last Sections we have briefly comprised the greatest part of what is necessary in the famous ten ranks of being, called the ten predicaments, or categories, of Aristotle, on which there are endless volumes of discourses formed by several of his followers. But that the reader may not utterly be ignorant of them, let him know the names are these : Substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, where, when, situation, and clothing. It would be mere loss of time to shew how loose, how injudicious, and even ridiculous, is this tenfold division of things ; and whatsoever farther relates to them, and which may tend to improve useful knowledge, should be sought in ontology, and in other sciences.
Besides substance and mode, some of the moderns would have us consider the substance modified as a distinct object of our ideas ; but I think there is nothing more that need be said on this subject than this, namely, There is some difference between a substance when it is considered with all its modes about it, or clothed in all its manners of existence, and when it is distinguished from them, and considered naked without them.
SECTION VI.
OF NOT-BEING.
As being is divided into substance and mode, so we may consider not-being with regard to both these.
I. Not-being is considered as excluding all substance, and then all modes are also necessarily excluded ; and this we call pure nihility or mere nothing.
This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philosophical sense ; so we say, there is nothing in the cup, in a vulgar sense, when we mean there is no liquor in it; but we cannot say there is nothing in the cup, in a strict philosophical sense, where there is air in it, and perhaps a million of rays of light are there.
II. Not-being, as it has relation to modes or manners of being, may be considered either as a mere negation, or as a privation.
A negation is the absence of that which does not naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which has no right, obligation, or necessity to be present with it; as when we say a stone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, it has no life, nor sight,
C„ap. 3. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. ly
nor hearing ; nor when we say a carpenter or a fisherman is unlearned, these are mere negations.
But a privation is the absence of what does naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which ought to be present with it, as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a physician or a divine be unlearned, these are called privations: So the sinfulness of any human action is said to be a privation ; for sin is that want of conformity to the law of God, which ought to be found in every action of man.
Note, There are some writers who make all sorts of relative modes or relations, as well as all external denominations, to be mere creatures of the mind, and entia rationis, and then they rank them also under the general head of not-beings : But it is my opinion, that whatsoever may be determined concerning mere mental relations and external denominations, which seem to have something less of entity or being in them, yet there are many real relations, which ought not to be reduced to so low a class ; such are the situation of bodies, their mutual distances, their particular proportions and measures, the notions of fatherhood, brotherhood, sonship, &c. all which are relative ideas. The very essence of virtue or holiness consists in the conformity of our actions to the rule of right reason, or the law of God : The nature and essence of sincerity is the conformity of our words and actions to our thoughts, all which are but mere relations ; and I think we must not reduce such positive beings as piety, and virtue, and truth, to the rank of non-entities, which have nothing real in them, though sin, or rather the sinfulness of an action, may be properly called a not-being, for it is a want of piety and virtue. Tins' is the most usual, and perhaps the justest way of representing these matters.
CHAPTER III.
OF THE SEVERAL SORTS OF PERCEPTIONS OR IDEAS.
IDEAS may be divided with regard to their original, their nature, their objects, and their qualities.
SECTION I.
OF SENSIBLE, SPIRITUAL, AND ABSTRACTED IDEAS.
There has been a great controversy about the origin of ideas, namely, whether any of our ideas are innate or no, that is, born with us, and naturally belonging to our minds. Mr. Locke utterly denies it ; others as positively affirm it. Now, though this controversy may be compromised, by allowing that there is a sense, wherein our first ideas of some things may be said to be innate, as I have shewn in some remarks on Mr. Locke's Essay, which have lain long by me, yet it does not belong to this place and business to have that point debated at large, nor will it hinder our pursuit of the present work to pass it over in silence.
There is sufficient ground to say, that all our ideas, with regard to their original, may be divided into three sorts, namely, sensible, spiritual, and abstracted ideas.
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CO LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part 1.
J. Sensible or corporeal ideas, are derived originally from our senses, and from the communication which the soul has with the animal body in this present state; such are the notions we frame of all colours, sounds, tastes, figures, or shapes and motions : For our senses being conversant about particular sensible objects, become the occasions of several distinct perceptions in the mind, and thus we come by the ideas of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities. All the ideas which we have of body, and the several modes and properties that belong to it, seem to be derived from sensation.
And howsoever these may be treasured up in the memory, and by the work of fancy may be encreased, diminished, compounded, divided, and diversified, which we are ready to call our invention, yet they all derive their first nature and being from something that has been let into our minds by one or other of our senses. If I think of a golden mountain, or a sea of liquid fire, yet the single ideas of sea, fire, mountain, and gold, came into my thoughts at first by sensation; the mind has only compounded them.
II. Spiritual* or intellectual ideas are those which we gain by reflecting on the nature and actions of our own souls, and turning our thoughts within ourselves, and observing what is transacted in our own minds. Such are the ideas we have of thought, assent, dissent, judging, reason, knowledge, understanding, will, love, fear, hope.
By sensation the soul contemplates things, as it were out of itself, and gains corporeal representations, or sensible ideas : By reflection the soul contemplates itself and things within itself, and by this means it gains spiritual ideas, or representations of things intellectual.
Here it may be noted, though the first original of these two sorts of ideas, namely, sensible and spiritual, may be entirely owing to these two principles, sensation and reflection, yet the recollection and fresh excitation of them may be owing to a thousand other occasions and occurrences of life. We could never inform a man who was born blind or deaf, what we mean by the words yellow, blue, red, or by the words loud or shrill, nor convey any just ideas of these things to his mind, by all the powers of lan- guage, unless he has experienced those sensations of sound and colour ; nor could we ever gain the ideas of thought, judgment, reason, doubting, hoping, &c. by all the words that man could invent, without turning our thoughts inward upon the actions of our own souls. Yet when once we have attained these ideas by sensation ami reflection, they may be excited afresh by the use of names, words, signs, or by any thing else that has been connected with them in our thoughts ; for when two or more ideas have been associated together, whether it be by custom, or accident, or design, the one presently brings the other to mind.
III. Besides these two which we have named, there is a third sort of ideas, which are commonly called abstracted ideas, because though the original ground or occasion of them may be sensation, or reflection, or both ; yet these ideas are framed by another act of the mind, which we usually call abstraction. Now the word abstraction signifies a withdrawing some parts of an idea from other parts of it, by which means such abstracted ideas are formed, as neither represent any thing corporeal or spiritual, that is, any thing peculiar or proper to mind or body. Now these are of two kinds.
Some of these abstracted ideas are the most absolute, general and universal concep-
* Here the word spiritual is used iu a mere natural, and not iu a religious sense.
Chap. 3. LOGTCK : OR, THE RTGHT USE OF REASON. 21
tions of things considered in themselves, without respect to others, such as entity or being, and not- being, essence, existence, act, power, substance, mode, accident, &c.
The other sort of abstracted ideas is relative, as when we compare several tilings together, and consider merely the relations of one thing to another, entirely dropping the subjects of those relations, whether they be corporeal or spiritual; such are our ideas of cause, effect, likeness, unlikeness, subject, object, identity, or sameness, and contra- riety, order, and other things which are treated of in ontology.
Most of the terms of art, hi several sciences, may be ranked under this head of abstracted ideas, as noun, pronoun, verb, in grammar, and the several particles of speech, as wherefore, therefore, when, how, although, howsoever, &c. so connections, transitions, similitudes, tropes, and their various forms in rhetoric.
These abstracted ideas, whether absolute or relative, cannot so properly be said to derive their immediate complete and distinct original, either from sensation, or reflection, (1.) Because the nature and the actions both of body and spirit give us occasion to frame exactly the same ideas of essence, mode, cause, effect, likeness, contrariety, &c. Therefore these cannot be called either sensible or spiritual ideas, for they are not exact representations either of the peculiar qualities or actions of spirit or body : But seem to be a distinct kind of idea framed in the mind, to represent our most general concep- tions of things, or their relations to one another, without any regard to their natures, whether they be corporeal or spiritual. And, (2.) The same general ideas of cause and effect, likeness, &c. may be transferred to a thousand other kinds of being, whether bodily or spiritual, besides those from whence we first derived them : Even those abstracted ideas, which might be first occasioned by bodies, may be as properly after- ward attributed to spirits.
Now, though Mr. Locke supposes sensation and reflection to be the two only springs of all ideas, and that these two are sufficient to furnish our minds with all that rich variety of ideas which we have; yet abstraction is certainly a different act of the mind, whence these abstracted ideas have their original ; though perhaps sensation or reflection may furnish us with all the first objects and occasions whence these abstracted ideas are excited and derived. Nor in this sense and view of things, can I think Mr. Locke himself would deny my representation of the original of abstracted ideas, nor forbid them to stand for a distinct species.
Note, Though we have divided ideas in this chapter into three sorts, namely, sensible, spiritual, and abstracted ;. yet it may not be amiss just to take notice here, that as man may be called a compound substance, being made up of body and mind, and the modes which arise from this composition are called mixed modes, such as sensation, passion, discourse, &c. so the ideas of this substance, or being called man, and of these mixed modes, may be called mixed ideas, for they are not properly and strictly spiritual, sensible, or abstracted. See a much larger account of every part of this chapter in the Philosophical Essays, by /. W. Essay 3, 4. &c.
22 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. pART f.
SECTION If.
OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX, COMPOUND AND COLLECTIVE IDEAS.
Ideas considered in their nature, are either simple or complex.
A simple idea is one uniform idea which cannot be divided or distinguished by the mind of man into two or more ideas ; such are a multitude of our sensations, as the idea of sweet, bitter, cold, heat, white, red, blue, hard, soft, motion, rest, and perhaps extension and duration : Such are also many of our spiritual ideas ; such as thought, wish, will, knowledge, &c.
A complex idea is made by joining two or more simple ideas together ; as a square, a triangle, a cube, a pen, a table, reading, writing, truth, falsehood, a body, a man, a horse, an angel, a heavy body, a swift horse, &c. Every thing that can be divided by the mind into two or more ideas is called complex.
Complex ideas are often considered as single and distinct beings, though they may be made up of several simple ideas ; so a body, a spirit, a house, a tree, a flower. But. when several of these ideas of a different kind are joined together, which are wont to be considered as distinct single beings, this is called a compounded idea, whether these united ideas be simple or complex. So a man is compounded of body and spirit, so mithridate is a compound medicine, "because it is made of many different ingredients : This I have shewn under the doctrine of substances. And modes also may be com- pounded; harmony is a compound idea, made up of different sounds united ; so several different virtues must be united to make up the compounded idea or character, either of a hero or a saint.
But when many ideas of the same kind are joined together, and united in one name, or under one view, it is called a collective idea ; so an army, or a parliament, is a collec- tion of men ; a dictionary, or nomenclatura, is a collection of words ; a flock is a collec- tion of sheep ; a forest, or grove, a collection of trees ; a heap is a collection of sand, or corn, or dust, &c. ; a city is a collection of houses ; a nosegay is a collection of flowers ; a month, or a year, is a collection of days ; and a thousand is a collection of units.
The precise difference between a compound and collective idea is this, that a com- pound idea unites things of a different kind, but a collective idea things of the same kind : Though this distinction in some cases is not accurately observed, and custom oftentimes uses the word compound for collective.
SECTION III.
OF universal and particular ideas, real and imaginary.
Ideas, according to their objects, may first be divided into particular or universal.
A particular idea is that which represents one thing only.
Sometimes the one thing is represented in a loose and indeterminate manner, as when we say, some man, any man, one man, another man; some horse, any horse; one city, or another, which is called by the schools individuum vagtan.
Sometimes the particular idea represents one thing in a determinate manner, and.
Chap. 3. IOGTCK : OR, THE RTOHT USE OF REASON. 23
then it is called a singular idea; such is Bucephalus, or Alexander's horse, Cicero the orator, Peter the apostle, the palace of Versailles, this book, that river, the new forest, or the city of London; that idea which represents one particular determinate thing to me, is called a singular idea, whether it be simple, or complex, or compound.
The object of any particular idea, as well as the idea itself, is sometimes called an individual : So Peter is an individual man, London is an individual city. So this book, one horse, another horse, are all individuals ; though the word individual is more usually limited to one singular, certain, and determined object.
An universal idea is that which represents a common nature agreeing to several parti- cular things, so a horse, a man, or a book, are called universal ideas, because they agree to all horses, men, or books.
And I think it not amiss to intimate, in this place, that these universal ideas are formed by that act of the mind which is called abstraction, that is, a withdrawing some part of an idea from other parts of it : For when singular ideas are first let into the mind by sensation or reflection, then, in order to make them universal, we leave out, or drop all those peculiar and determinate characters, qualities, modes, or circum- stances, which belong merely to any particular individual being, and by which it differs from other beings ; and we only contemplate those properties of it, wherein it agrees with other beings.
Though it must be confessed, that the name of abstracted ideas is sometimes attri- buted to universal ideas, both sensible or spiritual, yet this abstraction is not so great, as when we drop out of our idea every sensible or spiritual representation, and retain nothing but the most general and absolute conceptions of things, or their mere relations to one another, without any regard to their particular natures, whether they be sensible or spiritual. And it is to this kind of conceptions, we more properly give the name of abstracted ideas, as in the first section of this chapter.
An universal idea is either general or special.
A general idea is called by the schools a genus ; and it is one common nature agreeing to several other common natures. So animal is a genus, because it agrees to horse, lion, whale, butterfly, which are also common ideas ; so fish is a genus, because it agrees to trout, herring, crab, which are common natures also.
A special idea is called by the schools a species : It is one common nature that agrees to several singular individual beings ; so horse is a special idea, or a species, because it agrees to Bucephalus, Trott, and Snowball. City is a special idea, for it agrees to London, Paris, Bristol.
Note, 1. Some of these universals are genuses, if compared with less common natures; and they are species, if compared with natures more common. So bird is a genus, if compared with eagle, sparrow, raven, which are also common natures : But it is a species, if compared with the more general nature, animal. The same may be said of fish, beast, &c.
This sort of universal ideas, which may either be considered as a genus, or a species, is called subaltern ; but the highest genus, which is never a species, is called the most general ; and the lowest species, which is never a genus, is called the most special.
It may be observed here also, that that general nature or property wherein one thing agrees with most other things, is called its more remote genus : So substance is the remote genus of bird or beast, because it agrees not only to all kinds of animals, but
24 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part i.
also to things inanimate, as sun, stars, clouds, metals, stones, air, water, &c. but animal is the proximate or nearest genus of bird, because it agrees to fewest other things. Those general natures which stand between the nearest and most remote are called intermediate.
Note, 2. In universal ideas it is proper to consider their comprehension and their extension.*
The comprehension of an idea regards all the essential modes and properties of it; so body in its comprehension takes in solidity, figure, quantity, mobility, &c. So a bowl, in its comprehension, includes roundness, volubility, &c.
The extension of an universal idea regards all the particular kinds and single beiugs that are contained under it. So a body in its extension includes sun, moon, star, wood, iron, plant, animal, &c. which are several species, or individuals, under the general name of body. So a bowl in its extension includes a wooden bowl, a brass bowl, a white and black bowl, a heavy bowl, &c. and all kinds of bowls, together with all the particular individual bowls in the world.
Note, The comprehension of an idea is sometimes taken in so large a sense, as not only to include the essential attributes, but all the properties, modes, and relations whatsoever, that belong to any being, as will appear Chap. \ J.
This account of genus and species is part of that famous doctrine of universals, which is taught in the schools, with divers other formalities belonging to it ; for it is in this place that they introduce difference, which is the primary essential mode, and property, or the secondary essential mode, and accident, or the accidental mode ; and these they call the five predicables, because every thing that is affirmed concerning any being must be either the genus, the species, the difference, some property, or some acci- dent : But what farther is necessary to be said concerning these things will be mentioned when we treat of definition.
Having finished the doctrine of universal and particular ideas, I should take notice of another division of them, which also hath respect to their objects ; and that is, they are either real or imaginary.
Ileal ideas are such as have a just foundation in nature, and have real objects or exemplars, which did, or do, or may actually exist, according to the present state and nature of things ; such are all our ideas of long, broad, swift, slow, wood, iron, men, horses, thoughts, spirits, a cruel master, a proud beggar, a man seven feet high.
Imaginary ideas, which are also called fantastical or chhnerieal, are such as are made by enlarging, diminishing, uniting, dividing real ideas in the mind, in such a manner, as no objects, or exemplars, did or will ever exist, according to the present course of nature, though the several parts of these ideas are borrowed from real objects; such are the conceptions we have of a centaur, a satyr, a golden mountain, a flying horse, a dog without a head, a bull less than a mouse, or a mouse as big as a bull, and a man twenty feet high.
Some of these fantastic ideas are possible, that is, they are not utterly inconsistent in the nature of tilings; and therefore it is witiiiii the reach of divine power to make such objects; such are most of the instances already given; but impossibles carry an utter inconsistence in the ideas which are joined; such are self-active matter, and infinite or eternal men, a pious man without honesty, or heaven without holiness.
* Note, Tlie word extension here is taken in a mere logical sense, and not in a physical and mathematical sense.
ClIAP. 3. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 26
SECTION IV.
THE DIVISION OF IDEAS, WITH REGARD TO THEIR QUALITIES.
Ideas, with regard to their qualities, afford us these several divisions of them.
I. They are either clear and distinct, or obscure and confused.
II. They are vulgar or learned.
III. They are perfect or imperfect.
IV. They are true or false.
I. Our ideas are either clear and distinct, or obscure and confused.
Several writers have distinguished the clear ideas from those that are distinct ; and the confused ideas from those that are obscure ; and it must be acknowledged, there may be some difference between them ; for it is the clearness of ideas for the most part makes them distinct : And the obscurity of ideas is one thing that will always bring a sort of confusion into them. Yet when these writers come to talk largely upon this subject, and to explain and adjust their meaning with great nicety, I have generally found that they did not keep up the distinction they first designed, but they confound the one with the other. I shall therefore treat of clear or distinct ideas, as one and the same sort, and obscure or confused ideas, as another.
A clear and distinct idea is that which represents the object to the mind with full evidence and strength, and plainly distinguishes it from all other objects whatsoever.
An obscure and confused idea represents the object either so faintly, so imperfectly^ or so mingled with other ideas, that the object of it doth not appear plain to the mind, nor purely in its own nature, nor sufficiently distinguished from other things.
When we see the sea and sky nearer at hand, we have a clear and distinct idea of each ; but when we look far toward the horizon, especially in a misty day, our ideas of both are but obscure and confused ; for we know not which is sea and which is sky. So when we look at the colours of the rainbow, we have a clear idea of the red, the blue, the green in the middle of their several arches, and a distinct idea too, while the eye fixes there ; but when we consider the border of those colours, they so run into one another, that it renders their ideas confused and obscure. So the idea which we have of our brother, or our friend, whom we see daily, is clear and distinct ; but when the absence of many years has injured the idea, it becomes obscure and confused.
Note here, That some of our ideas may be very clear and distinct in one respect, and very obscure and confused in another. So when we speak of a chdliagonum, or a figure of a thousand angles, we may have a clear and distinct rational idea of the number one thousand angles ; for w<e can demonstrate various properties concerning it by reason : But the image or sensible idea which we have of the figure, is but confused and obscure; for we cannot precisely distinguish it by fancy from the image of a figure that has nine hundred angles, or nine hundred and ninety. So when we speak of the infinite divisi- bility of matter, we always keep in our minds a very clear and distinct idea of division and divisibility. But after we have made a little progress in dividing, and come to parts that are far too small for the reach of our senses, then our ideas, or sensible images of
vol. v. E
26 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part I.
these little bodies become obscure and indistinct, and the idea of infinite is very obscure, imperfect, and confused.
II. Ideas are either vulgar or learned. A vulgar idea represents to us the most obvious and sensible appearances that are contained in the object of them: But a learned idea penetrates further into the nature, properties, reasons, causes, and effects of things. — This is best illustrated by some examples.
It is a vulgar idea that we have of a rainbow, when we conceive a large arch in the clouds, made up of various colours parallel to each other : But it is a learned idea which a philosopher has when he considers it as the various reflections and refractions of sun- beams, in drops of falling rain. So it is a vulgar idea which we have of the colours of solid bodies, when we perceive them to be, as it were, a red, or blue, or green tincture of the surface of those bodies : But it is a philosophical idea when we consider the various colours to be nothing else but different sensations excited in us by the variously refracted rays of light, reflected on our eyes, in a different manner, according to the different size, or shape, or situation of the particles of which the surfaces of those bodies are com- posed. It is a vulgar idea which we have of a watch or clock, when we conceive of it as a pretty instrument, made to sIioav us the hour of the day : But it is a learned idea which the watch-maker has of it, who knows all the several parts of it, the spring, the balance, the chain, the wheels, their axles, &c. together with the various connections and adjustments of each part, whence the exact and uniform motion of the index is derived, which points to the minute or the hour. So when a common understanding reads Virgil's iEneid, he has but a vulgar idea of that poem, yet his mind is naturally entertained with the story, and his ears with the verse : But when a critic, or a man who has skill in poesy, reads it, he has a learned idea of its peculiar beauties, he tastes and relishes a superior pleasure ; he admires the Roman poet, and wishes he had known the Christian theology, which would have furnished him with nobler materials and machines than all the heathen idols.
It is with a vulgar idea that the world beholds the cartoons of Raphael at Hampton- Court, and every one feels his share of pleasure and entertainment : But a painter con- templates the wonders of that Italian pencil, and sees a thousand beauties in them, which the vulgar eye neglected : His learned ideas give him a transcendent delight, and yet, at the same time, discover the blemishes which the common gazer never observed.
III. Ideas are either perfect or imperfect, which are otherwise called adequate or inadequate.
Those are adequate ideas which perfectly represent their archetypes or objects. Inadequate ideas are but a partial, or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred.
All our simple ideas are, in some sense, adequate or perfect, because simple ideas, considered merely as our first perceptions, have no parts in them : So we may be said to have a perfect idea of white, black, sweet, sour, length, light, motion, rest, &c. We have also a perfect idea of various figures, as a triangle, a square, a cylinder, a cube, a sphere, which are complex ideas : But our idea or image of a figure of a thousand sides, our idea of the city of London, or the powers of a loadstone, are very imperfect, as well as all our ideas of infinite length or breadth, infinite power, wisdom or duration : For the idea of infinite is endless and ever growing, and can never be completed.
Chap. 3. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 07
Note, 1. When we have a perfect idea of any thing in all its parts, it is called a com- plete idea ; when in all its properties, it is called comprehensive. But when we have but an inadequate and imperfect idea, we are only said to apprehend it ; therefore we use the term apprehension, when we speak of our knowledge of God, who can never be comprehended by his creatures.
Note, 2. Though there are a multitude of ideas which may be called perfect, or adequate, in a vulgar sense ; yet there are scarce any ideas which are adequate, com- prehensive, and complete in a philosophical sense : For there is scarce any thing in the world that we know, as to all the parts, and powers, and properties of it, in perfection. Even so plain an idea as that of a triangle has, perhaps, infinite properties belonging to it, of which we know but a few. Who can tell what are the shapes and positions of those particles, which cause all the variety of colours that appear on the surface -of things? Who knows what are the figures of the little corpuscles that compose and dis- tinguish different bodies ? The ideas of brass, iron, gold, wood, stone, hyssop, and rosemary, have an infinite variety of hidden mysteries contained in the shape, size, motion, and position of the little particles of which they are composed ; and perhaps, also, infinite unknown properties and powers, that may be derived from them. And if we arise to the animal world, or the world of spirits, our knowledge of them must be amazingly imperfect, when there is not the least grain of sand or empty space, but has too many questions and difficulties belonging to it, for the wisest philosopher upon earth to answer and resolve.
IV. Our ideas are either true or false ; for an idea being the representation of a thing in the mind, it must be either a true or a false representation of it. If the idea be con- formable to the object or archetype of it, it is a true idea; if not, it is a false one. Sometimes our ideas are referred to things really existing without us as their archetypes. If I see bodies in their proper colours, I have a true idea ; but when a man under the jaundice sees all bodies yellow, he has a false idea of them. So if we see the sun or moon rising or setting, our idea represents them bigger than when they are on the meridian ; and in this sense it is a false idea, because those heavenly bodies are all day and all night of the same bigness. Or when I see a straight staff appear crooked Avhile it is half under the water, I say, the water gives me a false idea of it. Sometimes our ideas refer to the ideas of other men, denoted by such a particular word, as their arche- types : So when I hear a protestant use the words church and sacraments, if I under- stand by these words, a congregation of faithful men who profess Christianity, and the two ordinances, baptism and the Lord's-supper, I have a true idea of those words in the common sense of protestants : But if the man who speaks of them be a papist, he means the church of Rome and the seven sacraments, and then I have a mistaken idea of those words, as spoken by him, for he has a different sense and meaning : And in general, whensoever I mistake the sense of any speaker or writer, I may be said to have a false idea of it.
Some think that truth or falsehood properly belongs only to propositions, which shall be the subject of discourse in the Second Part of Logic ; for, if we consider ideas as mere impressions upon the mind, made by outward objects, those impressions will ever be conformable to the laws of nature in such a case : The water will make a stick appear crooked, and the horizontal air will make the sun and moon appear bigger. And geue-
e 2
28 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part 1.
rally where there is falsehood in ideas, there seems to be some secret or latent propo- sition, whereby we judge falsely of things : This is more obvious where we take up the words of a writer or speaker in a mistaken sense, for we join his words to our own ideas, which are different from his. But after all, since ideas are pictures of things, it can never be very improper to pronounce them to be true or false, according to their con- formity or nonconformity to their exemplars.
CHAPTER IV.
OF WORDS AND THEIR SEVERAL DIVISIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE ADVANTAGE AND
DANGER OF THEM.
SECTION I.
OF WORDS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR USE.
JL HOUGH our ideas are first acquired by the perception of objects, or by various sensations and reflections, yet we convey them to each other by the means of certain sounds, or written marks, which we call words ; and a great part of our knowledge is both obtained and communicated by these means, which are called speech or language.
But as we are led into the knowledge of things by words, so we are oftentimes led into error, or mistake, by the use or abuse of words also. And in order to guard against such mistakes, as well as to promote our improvement in knowledge, it is necessary to acquaint ourselves a little with words and terms. We shall begin with these obser- vations : —
1. Words, whether they are spoken or written, have no natural connection with the ideas they are designed to signify, nor with the things which are represented in those ideas. There is no manner of affinity between the sounds white in English, or blanc in French, and that colour which we call by that name ; nor have the letters, of which these words are composed any natural aptness to signify that colour rather than red or green. Words and names therefore are mere abitrary signs invented by men to commu- nicate their thoughts or ideas to one another.
2. If one single word were appointed to express but one simple idea, and nothing else, as white, black, sweet, sour, sharp, bitter, extension, duration, there would be scarce any mistake about them.
But, alas! it is a common unhappiness in language, that different simple ideas are sometimes expressed by the same word ;. so the words sweet and sharp are applied both to the objects of hearing and tasting, as we shall see hereafter; and this, perhaps, may be one cause or foundation of obscurity and error arising from words.
3. In communicating our complex ideas to one another, if we could join as many peculiar and appropriated words together in one sound, as we join simple ideas to make one complex one, we should seldom be in danger of mistaking : When I express the taste of an apple, which we call the bitter-sweet, none can mistake what 1 mean.
Yet this sort of composition would make all language a most tedious and unwieldy
Chap. 4. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 29
thing, since most of our ideas are complex, and many of them have eight or ten simple ideas in them ; so that the remedy would be worse than the disease ; for what is now expressed in one short word, as month, or year, would require two lines to express it. It is necessary, therefore, that single words be invented to express complex ideas, in order to make language short and useful.
But here is our great infelicity, that when single words signify complex ideas, one word can never distinctly manifest all the parts of a complex idea ; and thereby it will often happen, that one man includes more or less in his idea, than another does, while he affixes the same word to it. In this case there will be danger of mistake between them, for they do not mean the same object, though they use the same name. So, if one person or nation, by the word year mean twelve months of thirty days each, that is, three hundred and sixty days, another intend a solar year of three hundred and sixty- five days, and a third mean a lunar year, or twelve lunar months, that is, three hundred and fifty-four days, there will be a great variation and error in their account of things, unless they are well apprized of each other's meaning beforehand. This is supposed to be the reason, why some ancient histories and prophecies, and accounts of chronology, are so hard to be adjusted. And this is the true reason of so furious and endless debates on many points in divinity; the words church, worship, idolatry, repentance, faith, election, merit, grace, and many others which signify very complex ideas, are not applied to include just the same simple ideas, and the same number of them, by the various contending parties ; thence arise confusion and contest.
4. Though a single name does not certainly manifest to us all the parts of a complex idea, yet it must be acknowledged, that in many of our complex ideas, the single name may point out to us some chief property which belongs to the thing that the word signifies ; especially when the word or name is traced up to its original, through several languages from whence it is borrowed. So an apostle signifies one who is sent forth.
But this tracing of a word to its original, which is called etymology, is sometimes a very precarious and uncertain thing; and after all, we have made but little progress towards the attainment of the full meaning of a complex idea, by knowing some one chief property of it. We know but a small part of the notion of an apostle, by knowing barely that he is sent forth.
5. Many, if not most, of our words which are applied to moral and intellectual ideas, when traced up to their original in the learned languages, will be found to signify sensible and corporeal things : Thus the words apprehension, understanding, abstraction, inven- tion, idea, inference, prudence, religion, church, adoration, &c. have all a corporeal signification in their original. The name spirit itself signifies breath or air, in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew : Such is the poverty of all languages, they are forced to use these names for incorporeal ideas, which thing has a tendency to error and confusion..
6. The last thing 1 shall mention that leads us into many a mistake is, the multitude of objects that one name sometimes signifies ; there is almost an infinite variety of things and ideas both simple and complex, beyond all the words that are invented in any lan- guage ; thence it becomes almost necessary that one name should signify several things. Let us but consider the two colours of yellow and blue, if they are mingled together in any considerable proportion, they make a green : Now there may be infinite differences
30 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part 1.
of the proportions in the mixture of yellow and blue ; and yet we have only these three words, yellow, blue, and green, to signify all of them, at least by one single term.
When I use the word shore, I may intend thereby a coast of land near the sea, or a drain to carry off water, or a prop to support a building ; and by the sound of the word porter, who can tell whether I mean a man who bears burdens, or a servant who waits at a nobleman's gate? The world is fruitful in the invention of utensils of life, and new characters and offices of men, yet names entirely new are seldom invented ; therefore old names are almost necessarily used to signify new things, which may occasion much con- fusion and error in the receiving and communicating of knowledge.
Give me leave to propose one single instance, wherein all these notes shall be remark- ably exemplified. It is the word bishop, which in French is called eveque ; upon which I would make these several observations : 1. That there is no natural connection between the sacred office hereby signified, and the letters or sound which signify this office ; for both these words eveque and bishop signify the same office, though there is not one letter alike in them ; nor have the letters which compose the English or the French word any thing sacred belonging to them, more than the letters that compose the words king or soldier. 2. If the meaning of a word could be learned by its deriva- tion or etymology, yet the original derivation of words is oftentimes very dark and unsearchable ; for who would imagine that each of these words are derived from the Latin cpiscopus, or the Greek 'eWxozto? 1 Yet in this instance we happen to know cer- tainly the true derivation ; the French being anciently written evesque, is borrowed from the first part of the Latin word ; and the old English biscop from the middle of it. 3. The original Greek word signifies an overlooker, or one who stands higher than his fellows and overlooks them : It is a compound word, that primarily signifies sensible ideas, translated to signify or include several moral or intellectual ideas ; therefore all will grant that the nature of the office can never be known by the mere sound or sense of the word overlooker. 4. I add, farther, the word bishop or episcopus, even when it is thus translated from a sensible idea, to include several intellectual ideas, may yet equally signify an overseer of the poor ; an inspector of the customs ; a surveyor of the highways ; a supervisor of the excise, &c. but by the consent of men, and the language of scripture, it is appropriated to signify a sacred office of the church. 5. This very idea and name, thus translated from things sensible to signify a spiritual and sacred thing, contains but one property of it, namely, one that has ait oversight or care over others ; but it does not tell us whether it includes a care over one church, or many ; over the laity or the clergy. 6. Thence it follows, that those who, in the complex idea of the word bishop, include an oversight over the clergy, or over a whole diocese of people, a superiority of presbyters, a distinct power of ordination, &c. must necessarily disagree with those who include in it only the care of a single congregation. Thus, according to the various opinions of men, this word signifies a pope, a gallican bishop, a lutheran superintendant, an English prelate, a pastor of a single assembly, or a pres- byter or elder. Thus they quarrel with each other perpetually ; and it is well if any of them all have hit precisely the sense of the sacred writers, and included just the same ideas in it, and no others.
I might make all the same remarks on the word church or kirk, which is derived from fc$« o!xo;, or the house of the Lord, contracted into kyrioik, which some suppose to
Chap. 4. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 31
signify an assembly of christians, some take it for all the world that professes Christianity, and some make it to mean only the clergy ; and on these accounts it has been the occa- sion of as many and as furious controversies as the word bishop, which was mentioned before.
SECTION II.
OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE TERMS.
From these and other considerations it will follow, that if we would avoid error in our pursuit of knowledge, we must take good heed to the use of words and terms, and be acquainted with the various kinds of them.
I. Terms are either positive or negative.
Negative terms are such as have a little word or syllable of denying joined to them, according to the various idioms of every language, as unpleasant, imprudent, immortal, irregular, ignorant, infinite, endless, lifeless, deathless, nonsense, abyss, anonymous, where the prepositions, un, im, in, non, a, an, and the termination less, signify a negation, either in English, Latin, or Greek.
Positive terms are those which have no such negative appendices belonging to them, as life, death, end, sense, mortal.
But so unhappily are our words and ideas linked together, that we can never know which are positive ideas, and which are negative, by the word that is used to express them, and that for these reasons :
1. There are some positive terms which are made to signify a negative idea ; as dead is properly a thing that is deprived of life ; blind implies a negation or privation of *ight; deaf a want of hearing; dumb a denial of speech.
2. There are also some negative terms which imply positive ideas, such as, immortal and deathless, which signify ever-living, or a continuance in life ; insolent signifies rude and haughty ; indemnify to keep safe ; and infinite perhaps has a positive idea too, for it is au idea ever growing ; and when it is applied to God, it signifies his complete perfection.
3. There are both positive and negative terms, invented to signify the same, instead of contrary ideas ; as unhappy and miserable, sinless and holy, pure and undefiled, impure and filthy, unkind and cruel, irreligious and profane, unforgiving and revengeful, &c. and there is a great deal of beauty and convenience derived to any language from this variety of expression ; though sometimes it a little confounds our conceptions of being and not-being, our positive and negative ideas.
4. I may add also that there are some words which are negative in their original lan- guage, but seem positive to an Englishman, because the negation is unknown ; as abyss, a place without a bottom ; anodyne, an easing medicine ; amnesty, an unremembrance, or general pardon ; anarchy, a state without government ; anonymous, that is, nameless ; inept, that is, not fit ; iniquity, that is, unrighteousness ; infant, one that cannot speak, namely, a child ; injurious, not doing justice or right.
The way therefore to know whether any idea be negative or not, is to consider whe- ther it primarily imply the absence of any positive being, or mode of being ; if it doth, then it is a negation or negative idea ; otherwise it is a positive one, whether the word
32' LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part 1.
that expresses it be positive or negative. Yet after all, in many cases, this is very hard to determine, as in amnesty, infinite, abyss, which are originally relative terms, but they signify pardon, &c. which seem to be positives. So darkness, madness, clown, are posi- tive terms, but they imply the want of light, the want of reason, and the want of manners ; and perhaps these may be ranked among the negative ideas.
Here note, that in the English tongue two negative terms are equal to one positive, and signify the same thing-; as not' unhappy, signifies happy; not immortal, signifies mortal ; he is no imprudent niau, that is, he is a man of prudence : But the sense and force of the word in such a negative way of expression seem to be a little diminished.
SECTION III.
OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX TERMS.
II. Terms are divided into simple or complex. A simple term is one word, a com- plex term is when more words are used to signify one thing.
Some terms are complex in words, but not in sense, such is the second emperor of Rome ; for it excites in our mind only the idea of one man, namely, Augustus.
Some terms are complex in sense, but not in words ; so when I say an army, a forest, I mean a multitude of men, or trees ; and almost all our moral ideas, as well as many of our natural ones, are expressed in this manner ; religion, piety, loyalty, knavery, theft, include a variety of ideas in each term.
There are other terms which are complex both in words and sense ; so when I say a fierce dog, or a pious man, it excites an idea not only of those two creatures, but of their peculiar characters also.
Among the terms that are complex in sense, but not in words, we may reckon those simple terms which contain a primary and a secondary idea in them ; as when I hear my neighbour speak that which is not true, and 1 say to him, this is not true, or this is false, I only convey to him the naked idea of his error ; this is the primary idea : But if 1 say it is a lie, the word lie carries also a secondary idea in it, for it implies both the false- hood of the speech, and my reproach and censure of the speaker. On the other hand, if I say it is a mistake, this carries also a secondary idea with it ; for it not only refers to the falsehood of his speech, but includes my tenderness and civility to him at the same time. Another instance may be this ; when I use the word, incest, adultery, and murder, I convey to another not only the primary idea of those actions, but I include also the secondary idea of their unlawfulness, and my abhorrence of them.
Note, First, Hence it comes to pass, that among words which signify the same prin- cipal ideas, some are clean and decent, others unclean ; some chaste, others obscene ; some are kind, others are affronting and reproachful, because of the secondary idea which custom has affixed to them. And it is the part of a wise man, when there is a necessity of expressing any evil actions, to do it either by a word that has a secondary idea of kindness or softness ; or a word that carries with it an idea of rebuke and seve- rity, according as the case requires : So when there is a necessity of expressing things unclean or obscene, a wise man will do it in the most decent language, to excite as few uncleanly ideas as possible in the minds of the hearers.
Note, Secondly, lu length of time, and by the power of custom, words sometimes
Chap. 4. LOGICK: OR, THE IUGI1T USE OF REASON. S:i
change their primary ideas, as shall be declared, and sometimes they have; changed their secondary ideas, though the primary ideas may remain : So words that were once chaste, by frequent use grow obscene and uncleanly ; and words that were once honour- able may, in the next generation, grow mean and contemptible. So the word dame originally signified a mistress of a family, who was a lady, and it is used still in tfie English law to signify a lady ; but in common use now-a-days it represents a farmers wife, or a mistress of a family of the lower rank in the country. So those words of Rabshakeh, Isaiah xxxvi. 12. in our translation, Eat their own dung, &c. were doubt- less decent and clean language, when our translators wrote them, above a hundred years ago. The word dung has maintained its old secondary idea and inoffensive sense to this day ; but the other word in that sentence has by custom acquired a more uncleanly idea, and should now rather be changed into a more decent term, and so it should be read in public, unless it should be thought more proper to omit the sentence.*
For this reason it is that the Jewish rabbins have supplied other chaste words in the margin of the Hebrew Bible, where the words of the text, through time and custom, are degenerated, so as to carry any base and unclean secondary idea in them ; and they read the word which is in the margin, which they call keri, and not that whicK was written in the text, which they called c/ietib.
SECTION IV.
OF WORDS COMMON AND PROPER.
III. Words and names are either common or proper. Common names are such as stand for universal ideas, or a whole rank of beings, whether general or special. These are called appellatives ; so fish, bird, man, city, river, are common names; and so are trout, eel, lobster, for they all agree to many individuals, and some of them to many species : But Cicero, Virgil, Bucephalus, London, Rome, JEtna, the Thames, are proper names, for each of them agrees only to one single being.
Note here, Jirst, That a proper name may become in some sense common, when it hath been given to several beings of the same kind ; so Ciesar, which was the proper name of the first emperor Julius, became also a common name to all the following emperors. And tea, which was the proper name of one sort of Indian leaf, is now-a-days become a common name for many infusions of herbs, or plants, in water ; as sage-tea, alehoof- tea, lemon-tea, &c. So Peter, Thomas, John, William, may be reckoned common names also, because they are given to many persons, unless they are determined to signify a single person at any particular time or place.
Note in the second place, That a common name may become proper by custom, or by the time, or place, or persons that use it; as in Great Britain, when we say the King, we mean our present rightful sovereign King George, who now reigns ; when we speak of the Prince, we intend his Royal Highness George Prince of Wales : If we men- tion the city, when we are near London, we generally mean the city of London : When in a country town, we say the parson, or the esquire, all the parish knows who are the
* So in some places of the sacred historians, where it is written, Every one that pisseth against the wall, we should read, Every male.
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34 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Paet 1.
single persons intended by it ; so when we are speaking of the history of the New Testament, and use the words Peter, Paul, John, we mean those three apostles.
Note in the third place, That any common name whatsoever is made proper, by terms of particularity added to it, as the common words pope, king, horse, garden, book, knife, &c. are designed to signify a singular idea, when we say the present pope ; the king of Great Britain ; the horse that won the last plate at Newmarket ; the royal garden at Kensington ; this book ; that knife, &c.
SECTION V.
OF CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT TERMS.
IV. Words or terms are divided into abstract and concrete.
Abstract terms signify the mode or quality of a being, without any regard to the sub- ject in which it is ; as whiteness, roundness, length, breadth, wisdom, mortality, life, death.
Concrete terms, while they express the quality, do also either express, or imply, or refer to some subject to which it belongs ; as white, round, long, broad, wise, mortal, living, dead. But these are not always noun adjectives in a grammatical sense; for a fool, a knave, a philosopher, and many other concretes, are substantives, as well as knavery, folly, and philosophy, which are the abstract terms that belong to them.
SECTION VI.
OF UNIVOCAL AND EQUIVOCAL WORDS.
V. Words and terms are either univocal or equivocal. Univocal words are such as signify but one idea, or at least but one sort of thing ; equivocal words are such as sig- nify two or more different ideas, or different sorts of objects. The words book, bible, fish, house, elephant, may be called univocal words ; for I know not that they signify any thing else but those ideas to which they are generally affixed ; but head is an equi- vocal word, for it signifies the head of a nail, or of a pin, as well as of an animal : Nail is an equivocal word, it is used for the nail of the hand, or foot, and for an iron nail to fasten any thing. Post is equivocal, it is a piece of timber, or a swift messenger. A church is a religious assembly, or the large fair building where they meet ; and some- times the same word means a synod of bishops, or of presbyters, and in some places it is the pope and a general council.
Here let it be noted, that when two or more words signify the same thing, as wave and billow, mead and meadow, they are usually called synonymous words : But it seems very strange, that words, which are directly contrary to each other, should sometimes represent almost the same ideas ; yet thus it is in some few instances ; a valuable, or an invaluable blessing ; a shameful, or a shameless villain ; a thick skull, or a thin-skulled fellow, a mere paper skull ; a man of a large conscience, little conscience, or no con- science; a famous rascal, or an infamous one. So uncertain a thing is human language, whose foundation and support is custom!
As words signifying the same thing are called synonymous, so equivocal words, or
Chap. 4. LOGICK : OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 35
those which signify several things, are called homonymous, or ambiguous ; and when persons use such ambiguous words, with a design to deceive, it is called equivocation.
Our simple ideas, and especially the sensible qualities, furnish us with a great variety of equivocal or ambiguous words ; for these being the first, and most natural ideas we have, we borrow some of their names, to signify many other ideas, both simple and complex. The word sweet expresses the pleasant perceptions of almost every sense'; sugar is sweet, but it hath not the same sweetness as music ; nor hath music the sweetness of a rose; and a sweet prospect differs from them all; nor yet have any of these the same sweetness as discourse, counsel, or meditation hath ; yet the royal psalmist saith of a man, We took sweet counsel together; and of God, my meditation of him shall be sweet. Bitter is also such an equivocal word; there is bitter wormwood, there are bitter words, there are bitter enemies, and a bitter cold morning. So there is a sharpness in vinegar, and there is a sharpness in pain, in sorrow and in reproach ; there is a sharp eye, a sharp wit, and a sharp sword : But there is not one of these seven sharpnesses the same as another of them, and a sharp east wind is different from them all.
There are also verbs or words of action, which are equivocal, as well as nouns or names. The words to bear, to take, to come, to get, are sufficient instances of it ; as when we say, to bear a burden, to bear sorrow or reproach, to bear a name, to bear a grudge, to bear fruit, or to bear children, the word bear is used in very different senses : And so is the word get, when we say, to get money, to get in, to get off, to get ready, to get a stomach, and to get a cold, &c.
There is also a great deal of ambiguity in many of the English particles ; as but, before, beside, with, without, that, then, there, for, forth, above, about, &c. of which grammars and dictionaries will sufficiently inform us.
SECTION VII.
VARIOUS KINDS OF EQUIVOCAL WORDS.
It would be endless to run through all the varieties of words and terms, which have different senses applied to them ; I shall only mention therefore a few of the most remarkable and most useful distinctions among them.
First, The first division of equivocal words let us know that some are equivocal only in their sound or pronunciation ; others are equivocal only in writing, and others, both in writing and in sound.
Words equivocal in sound only, are such as these; the rein of a bridle, which hath the same sound with the reign of a king, or a shower of rain : But all three have different letters, and distinct spelling-. So might, or strength, is equivocal in sound, but differs in writing from mite, a little animal, or a small piece of money. And the verb to write, has the same sound with wright a workman, right or equity, and rite or ceremony ; but it is spelled very differently in them all.
• Words equivocal in writing only are such as these; to tear to pieces, has the same spelling with a tear : To lead, or guide, has the same letters as lead, the metal : And a bowl for recreation, is written the same way as a bowl for drinking : But the pronunciation of all these is different.
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36 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part 1.
But those words which are most commonly and justly called equivocal, are such as are both written and pronounced the same way, and yet have different senses or ideas belonging to them ; such are all the instances which were given in the preceding Section.
Among the words which are equivocal in sound only, and not in writing, there is a large held for persons who delight in jests and puns, in riddles and quibbles, to sport themselves. This sort of words is also used by wanton persons to convey lewd ideas, under the covert of expressions capable of a chaste meaning, which are called double entendres ; or when persons speak falsehood with a design to deceive, under the covert of truth. Though it must be confessed, that all sorts of equivocal words yield sufficient matter for such purposes.
There are many cases also, wherein an equivocal word is used, for the sake of decency, to cover a foul idea : For the most chaste and modest, and well-bred persons, having sometimes a necessity to speak of the things of nature, convey their ideas in the most inoffensive language by this means. And indeed, the mere poverty of all languages makes it necessary to use equivocal words upon many occasions, as the common writings of men, and even the holy book of God, sufficiently manifest.
Secondly. Equivocal words are usually distinguished, according to their original, into such whose various senses arise from mere chance or accident, and such as are made equivocal by design ; as the word bear signifies a shaggy beast, and it signifies also to bear or carry a burden ; this seems to be the mere effect of chance : But if I call my dog, bear, because he is shaggy, or call one of the northern constellations by that name, from a fancied situation of the stars in the shape of that animal, then it is by design that the word is made yet further equivocal.
But because I think this common account of the spring or origin of equivocal words is too slight and imperfect, I shall reserve this subject to be treated of by itself, and proceed to the third division.
Thirdly. Ambiguous, or equivocal words, are such as are sometimes taken in a large and general sense, and sometimes in a sense more strict and limited, and have different ideas affixed to them accordingly. Religion, or virtue, taken in a large sense, includes both our duty to God and our neighbour; but in a more strict, limited and proper sense, virtue signifies our duty towards men, and religion our duty to God. Virtue may yet be taken in the strictest sense, and then it signifies power or courage, which is the sense of it in some places of the New Testament. So grace, taken in a large sense, means the favour of God, and all the spiritual blessings that proceed from it, which is a frequent sense of it in the Bible; but in a limited sense it signifies the habit of holiness wrought in us by divine favour, or a complex idea of the christian virtues. It may also be taken in the strictest sense ; and thus it signifies any single christian virtue, as in 2 Cor. v hi. (}, 7. where it is used for liberality. So a city, in a strict and proper sense, means the houses inclosed within the walls; in a larger sense, it reaches to all the suburbs.
This larger and stricter sense of a word is used in almost all the sciences, as well as in theology, and in common life. The word geography, taken in a strict sense, signifies the knowledge of the circles of the earthly globe, and the situation of the various parts of the earth ; when it is taken in a little larger sense, it includes the know ledge of the seas also; and in the largest sense of all, it extends to the various customs, habits, and governments of nations. When an astronomer uses the word star in its proper and
Chap. 4. LOOICK : OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 37
strict sense, it is applied only to the fixed stars, but in a large sense it includes the planets also.
This equivocal sense of words belongs also to many proper names: So Asia, taken in the largest sense, is one quarter of the world ; in a more limited sense it signifies Natolia, or the Lesser Asia ; but in the strictest sense it means no more than one little province of Natolia, where stood the cities of Ephesus, Smyrna, Sardis, kc. And this is the most frequent sense of it in the New Testament. Flanders and Holland, in a strict sense, are but two single provinces among the seventeen, but in a large sense Holland includes seven of them, and Flanders ten.
There are also some very common and little words in all languages, that are used in a more extensive, or more limited sense ; such as all, every, whatsoever, &c. When the apostle says, all men have sinned, and all men must die, all is taken in its most universal and extensive sense, including all mankind; Rom. v. 12. When he appoints prayer to be made for all men, it appears by the following verses, that he restrains the word all to signify chiefly all ranks and degrees of men; I Tim. ii. 1. But when St. Paul says, I please all men in all things, 1 Cor. x. 33. the word all is exceedingly limited, for it reaches no farther than that he pleased all those men whom he conversed with, in all things that were lawful.
Fourthly. Equivocal words arc, in the fourth place, distinguished by their literal or figurative sense. Words are used in a proper or literal sense, when they are designed to signify those ideas for which they were originally made, or to which they are primarily and generally annexed ; but they are used in a figurative or tropical sense, when they are made to signify some things, which only bear either a reference or a resemblance to the primary ideas of them. So when two princes contend by their armies, we say they are at war, in a proper sense ; but when we say there is a war betwixt the winds and the waves in a storm, this is called figurative, and the peculiar figure is a metaphor. So when the scripture says, riches make themselves wings, and fly away as an eagle toward heaven, the wings and the flight of the eagle are proper expressions ; but when flight and wings are applied to riches, it is only by way of figure and metaphor. So when a man is said to repent, or laugh, or grieve, it is literally taken ; but when God is said to be grieved, to repent, or laugh, &c. these are all figurative expressions borrowed from a resemblance to mankind. And when the words Job or Esther are used to signify those very persons, it is the literal sense of them ; but when they signify those two books of scripture, this is a figurative sense. The names of Horace, Juvenal, and Milton, are used in the same manner, either for books or men.
When a word, which originally signifies any particular idea or object, is attributed to several other objects, not so much by way of resemblance, but rather on the account of some evident reference or relation to the original idea, this is sometimes peculiarly called an analogical word ; so a sound or healthy pulse ; a sound digestion ; sound sleep ; are all so called with reference to a sound and healthy constitution : But if you speak of sound doctrine or sound speech, this is by way of resemblance to health, and the words are metaphorical : Yet many times analogy and metaphor are used pro- miscuously in the same sense, and not distinguished.
Here note, That the design of metaphorical language, and figures of speech, is not merely to represent our ideas, but to represent them with vivacity, spirit, affection, and power ; and though they often make a deeper impression on the mind of the hearer, yet
58 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Parti.
they do as often lead him into a mistake, if they are used at improper times and places. Therefore, where the design of the speaker or writer is merely to explain, to instruct, and to lead into the knowledge of naked truth, he ought, for the most part, to use plain and proper words, if the language affords them, and not to deal much in figurative speech. But this sort of terms is used very profitably by poets and orators, whose business is to move, and persuade, and work on the passions, as well as on the understanding. Figures are also happily employed in proverbial moral sayings by the wisest and the best of men, to impress them deeper on the memory by sensible images ; and they are often used for other valuable purposes in the sacred writings.
5thly. I might adjoin another sort of equivocal words ; as there are some which have a different meaning in common language, from what they have in the sciences ; the word passion signifies the receiving any action, in a large philosophical sense ; in a more limited philosophical sense, it signifies any of the affections of human nature, as love, fear, joy, sorrow, &c. But the common people confine it only to anger : So the word simple, philosophically, signifies single ; but vulgarly it is used for foolish.
Gthh/, Other equivocal words are used sometimes in an absolute sense, as when God is called perfect, which allows of no defect; and sometimes in a comparative sense, as good men are oftentimes called perfect in scripture, in comparison of those who are much inferior to them in knowledge or holiness: But I have dwelt rather too long upon this subject already, therefore I add no more.
SECTION VIII.
THE ORIGIN OR CAUSES OF EQUIVOCAL WORDS.
Now, that we may become more skilful in guarding ourselves and others against the danger of mistakes which may arise from equivocal words, it may not be amiss to conclude this chapter with a short account of the various ways or means whereby a word changes its signification, or acquires any new sense, and thus becomes equivocal, especially if it keeps its old sense also.
1. Mere chance sometimes gives the same word different senses; as the word light signifies a body that is not heavy; and it also signifies the effect of sun-beams, or the medium whereby we see objects: This is merely accidental, for there seems to be no connection between these two senses, nor any reason for them.
2. Error and mistake is another occasion of giving various senses to the same word; as when different persons read the names of priest, bishop, church, easter, &c. in the New Testament, they affix different ideas to them, for want of acquaintance with the true meaning of the sacred writer ; though it must be confessed, these various senses, which might arise at first from honest mistake, may be culpably supported and propagated by interest, ambition, prejudice, and a party-spirit on any side.
3. Time and custom alter the meaning of words. Knave heretofore signified a diligent servant, gnatvus ; and a villain was an under tenant to the lord of the manor, milieus ; but now both these words carry an idea of wickedness and reproach with them. A ballad once signified a solemn and sacred song, as well as one that is trivial, when Solomon's Song was called the ballad of ballads ; but now it is applied to nothing but trifling verse, or comical subjects.
Chap. 4. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 3.9
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4. Words change their sense by figures and metaphors, which are derived from some real analogy or resemblance between several things; as when wings and flight are applied to riches, it signifies only that the owner may as easily lose thein, as he would lose a bird who flew away with wings.
And I think, under this head, we may rank those words, which signify different ideas, by a sort of an unaccountable far-fetched analogy, or distant resemblance, that fancy has introduced between one thing and another ; as when we say, the meat is green, when it is half-roasted : We speak of airing linen by the fire, when we mean drying or warming it : We call for round coals for the chimney, when we mean large square ones : And we talk of the wing of a rabbit, when we mean the fore-leg : The true reason of these appellations we leave to the critics.
5. Words also change their sense by the special occasion of using them, the peculiar manner of pronunciation, the sound of the voice, the motion of the face, or gestures of the body; so when an angry master says to his servant, It is bravely done! or, You are a fine gentleman! he means just the contrary; namely, It is very ill done; You are a sorry fellow : It is one way of giving a severe reproach, for the words are spoken by way of sarcasm, or irony.
0. Words are applied to various senses, by new ideas appearing or arising faster than new words are framed. So when gunpowder was found out, the word powder, which before signified only dust, was made then to signify that mixture or composition of nitre, charcoal, &c. And the name canon, which before signified a law or a rule, is now also given to a great gun, which gives laws to nations. So foot-boys, who had frequently the common name of Jack given them, were kept to turn the spit, or to pull off their master's boots; but when instruments were invented for both those services, they were both called jacks, though one was of iron, the other of wood, and very different in their form.
7. Words alter their significations according to the ideas of the various persons, sects, or parties, who use them, as we have hinted before; so when a papist uses the word heretics, he generally means the protestants ; when a protestant uses the word, he means any persons who were wilfully, and perhaps contentiously, obstinate in fundamental errors. When a Jew speaks of the true religion, he means the institutions of Moses ; when a Turk mentions it, he intends the doctrine of Mahomet ; but when a Christian makes use of it, he designs to signify Christianity, or the truths and precepts of the gospel.
8. Words have different significations according to the book, writing, or discourse in which they stand. So in a treatise of anatomy, a foot signifies that member in the body of man : But in a book of geometry or mensuration, it signifies twelve inches.
If I had room to exemplify most of these particulars in one single word, I know not where to choose a fitter than the word sound, which seems, as it were by chance, to signify three distinct ideas, namely, healthy, from sanus, as a sound body ; noise, from souus, as a shrill sound ; and to sound the sea, perhaps from the French sonde, a probe, or an instrument to find the depth of water. From these three, which I may call original senses, various derivative senses arise; as sound sleep, sound lungs, sound wind and limb, a sound heart, a sound mind, sound doctrine, a sound divine, sound reason, a sound cask, sound timber, a sound reproof, to beat one soundly, to sound one's mean- ing or inclination, and a sound or narrow sea ; turn these all into Latin, and the variety will appear plain.
40 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part K
I confess, some few of these which f have mentioned as the different springs of equi- vocal words, may be reduced in some cases to the same original : But it must also be granted, that there may be other ways besides these whereby a word comes to extend its signification, to include various ideas, and become equivocal. And though it is the business of a grammarian to pursue these remarks with more variety and particularity, yet it is also the work of a logician to give notice of these things, lest darkness, con- fusion, and perplexity, be brought into our conceptions by the means of words, antj thence our judgments and reasonings become erroneous.
CHAPTER V.
GENERAL DIRECTIONS RELATING TO OUR IDEAS. DIRECTION I.
-T URNISH yourselves with a rich variety of ideas ; acquaint yourselves with things ancient and modern; things natural, civil and religious; things domestic and national ; things of your native land, and of foreign countries; things present, past, and future; and above all, be well acquainted with God and yourselves ; learn animal nature, and the workings of your own spirits.
Such a general acquaintance with things will be of very great advantage.
The first benefit of it is this ; it will assist the use of reason in all its following opera- tions ; it will teach you to judge of things aright, to argue justly, and to methodise your thoughts with accuracy. When you shall find several things akin to each other, and several different from each other, agreeing in some part of their idea, and disagreeing in other parts, you will range your ideas in better order, you will be more easily led into a distinct knowledge of things, and will obtain a rich store of proper thoughts and argu- ments upon all occasions.
You will tell me, perhaps, that you design the study of the law or divinity; and what good can natural philosophy or mathematics do you, or any other science, not directly subordinate to your chief design? But let it be considered, that all sciences have a sort of mutual connection; and knowledge of all kinds fits the mind to reason and judge better concerning any particular subject. I have known a judge upon the bench betray his ignorance, and appear a little confused in his sentiments, about a case of suspected murder brought before him, for want of some acquaintance with animal nature and philosophy.
Another benefit of it is this ; such a large and general acquaintance with things will secure you from perpetual admirations and surprises, and guard you against that weak- ness of ignorant persons, who have never seen any thing beyond the confines of their own dwelling, ami therefore they wonder at almost every thing they see ; every thing beyond the smoke of their own chimney, and the reach of their own windows, is new and strange to them.
A third benefit of such an universal acquaintance with things, is this ; it will keep you from being too positive and dogmatical, from an excess of credulity and unbelief, that is, a readiness to believe, or to deny every thing at first hearing; when you shall
LOGICK: OP,, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 41
have often seen, that strange and uncommon things, which often seemed incredible, are found to be true; and things very commonly received as true, have been found to be false.
The way of attaining such an extensive treasure of ideas, is, with diligence to apply yourself to read the best books; converse with the most knowing and wisest of men; and endeavour to improve by every person in whose company you are; suffer no hour to pass away in a lazy idleness, an impertinent chattering or useless trifles; visit other cities and countries when you have seen your own, under the care of one who can teach you to profit by travelling, and to make wise observations ; indulge a just curiosity in seeing the wonders of art and nature ; search into things yourself, as well as learn them from others ; be acquainted with men as well as books ; learn all things as much as you can at first hand ; and let as many of your ideas as possible be the representations of things, and not merely the representations of other men's ideas : Thus your soul, like some noble building, shall be richly furnished with original paintings, and not with mere copies.
Direction II. Use the most proper methods to retain that treasure of ideas which you have acquired ; for the mind is ready to let many of them slip, unless some pains and labour be taken to fix them upon the memory.
And more especially let those ideas be laid up and preserved with the greatest care, which are most directly suited, either to your eternal welfare, as a christian, or to your particular station and profession in this life ; for though the former rule recommends an universal acquaintance with things, yet it is but a more general and superficial know- ledge that is required or expected of any man, in things which are utterly foreign to his own business : But it is necessary you should have a more particular and accurate acquaintance with those things that refer to your peculiar province and duty in this life, or your happiness in another.
There are some persons who never arrive at any deep, solid, or valuable knowledge in any science, or any business in life, because they are perpetually fluttering over the surface of things, in a curious and wandering- search of infinite variety ; ever hear- ing, reading, or asking after something new, but impatient of any labour to lay up and preserve the ideas they have gained : Their souls may be compared to a looking-glass, that wheresoever you turn it, it receives the images of all objects, but retains none.
In order to preserve your treasure of ideas, and the knowledge you have gained, pursue the following advices, especially in your younger years :
1. Recollect every day the things you have seen, or heard, or read, which may have made any addition to your understanding : Read the writings of God and men with dili- gence and perpetual reviews : Be not fond of hastening to a new book, or a new chapter, till you have well fixed and established in your mind what was useful in the last : Make use of your memory in this manner, and you will sensibly experience a gradual improve- ment of it, while you take care not to load it to excess.
2. Talk over the things which you have seen, heard, or learned, with some proper acquaintance. This will make a fresh impression upon your memory ; and if you have no fellow-student at hand, none of equal rank with yourself, tell it over to any of your acquaintance, where you can do it with propriety and decency; and whether they learn any thing by it or no, your own repetition of it will be an improvement to yourself t
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42 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Pabt l.
And this practice also will furnish you with a variety of words, and copious language to express your thoughts upon all occasions.
3. Commit to writing some of the most considerable improvements which you daily make, at least such hints as may recal them again to your mind, when perhaps they are vanished and lost. And here I think Mr. Locke's method of adversaria, or common- places, which he describes in the end of the first volume of his Posthumous Works, is the best ; using no learned method at all, setting down things as they occur, leaving a distinct page for each subject, and making an index to the pages.
At the end of every week, or month, or year, you may review your remarks for these reasons: First, to judge of your own improvement; when you shall find that many of your younger collections are either weak and trifling ; or if they are just and proper, yet they are grown now so familiar to you, that you will thereby see your own advancement in knowledge. And in the next place, what remarks you find there worthy of yonr riper observation, you may note them with a marginal star, instead of transcribing them, as being worthy of your second year's review, when the others are neglected.*
To shorten something of this labour, if the books which you read are your own, mark with a pen or pencil the most considerable things in them which you desire to remember. Thus you may read that book the second time over with half the trouble, by your eye running over the paragraphs which your pencil has noted. It is but a very weak objec- tion against this practice to say, I shall spod my book ; for I persuade myself, that you did not buy it as a bookseller to sell it again for gain, but as a scholar, to improve your mind by it ; and if the mind be improved, your advantage is abundant, though your book yields less money to your executors.
Direction III. As you proceed both in learning and in life, make a wise observation what are the ideas, what the discourses and the parts of knowledge that have been more or less useful to yourself or others. In our younger years, while we are furnishing our minds with a treasure of ideas, our experience is but small, and our judgment weak; it is therefore impossible at that age to determine aright concerning the real advantage and usefulness of many things we learn. But when age and experience have matured your judgment, then you will gradually drop the more useless part of your younger furniture, and be more solicitous to retain that which is most necessary for your welfare in this life, or a better. Hereby you will come to make the same complaint that almost every learned man has done after long experience in study, and in the affairs of human life and religion : Alas ! how many hours, and days, and months, have I lost in pursuing some parts of learning, and in reading some authors, which have turned to no other account, but to inform me that they were not worth my labour and pursuit! Happy the man who has a wise tutor to conduct him through all the sciences in the first years of his study ; and who has a prudent friend always at hand to point out to him, from expe- rience, how much of every science is worth his pursuit! And happy the student that is so wise as to follow such advice.
Direction IV. Learn to acquire a government over your ideas and your thoughts,
* Note, This advice of writing, marking, and reviewing your marks, refers chiefly to those occasional notions you meet with either in reading or in conversation ; but when you are directly and professedly pursuing any subject of knowledge in a good system in your younger years, the system itself is your common-place-book, and must be entirely reviewed. The same may be said concerning any treatise which closel), succinctly, and accurately handles any parti- cular theme.
Chap. 5. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. .43
that they may come when they are called, and depart when they are bidden. There are some thoughts that rise and intrude upon us while we shun them ; there are others that fly from us, when we would hold and fix them.
If the ideas which you would willingly make the matter of your present meditation are ready to fly from you, you must be obstinate in the pursuit of them by an habit of fixed meditation ; you must keep your soul to the work, when it is ready to start aside every moment, unless you will abandon yourself to be a slave to every wild imagination. It is a common, but it is an unhappy and a shameful thing, that every trifle that conies across the senses or fancy should divert us, that a buzzing fly should teize our spirits and scatter our best ideas : But we must learn to be deaf to, and regardless of other things, besides that which we make the present subject of our meditation: And in order to help a wandering and fickle humour, it is useful to have a book or paper in our hands, which has some proper hints of the subject that we design to pursue. We must be resolute and laborious, and sometimes conflict with ourselves, if we would be wise and learned.
Yet I would not be too severe in this rule : It must be confessed there are seasons when the mind, or rather the brain, is over-tired or jaded with study or thinking; or upon some other accounts animal nature may be languid or cloudy, and unfit to assist the spirit in meditation ; at such seasons, provided that they return not too often, it is better sometimes to yield to the present indisposition : For if nature entirely resist, nothing can be done to the purpose, at least in that subject or science. Then you may think it proper to give yourself up to some hours of leisure and recreation, or useful idleness : Or if not, then turn your thoughts to some other alluring subject, and pore no longer upon the first, till some brighter or more favourable moments arise. A student shall do more in one hour, when all things concur to invite him to any special study, than in four hours, at a dull and improper season.
I would also give the same advice, if some vain, or worthless, or foolish idea, will crowd itself into your thoughts ;, and if you find that all your labour and wrestling cannot defend yourself from it, then divert the importunity of that which offends you by turning your thoughts to some entertaining subject, that may amuse a little, and draw you off from the troublesome and imposing guest ; and many a time also in such a case, when the impertinent and intruding ideas would divert from present duty, devo- tion and prayer have been very successful to overcome such obstinate troublers of the peace and profit of the soul.
If the natural genius and temper be too volatile, fickle, and wandering, such persons ought in a more especial manner to apply themselves to mathematical learning, and to begin their studies with arithmetic and geometry ; wherein new truths continually arising to the mind, out of the plainest and easiest principles, will allure the thoughts "with incredible pleasure in the pursuit : This will give the student such a delightful taste of reasoning, as will fix his attention to the single subject which he pursues, and by degrees will cure the habitual levity of his spirit : But let him not indulge and pursue these so far, as to neglect the prime studies of his designed profession.
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44 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part 1.
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CHAPTER VI.
SPECIAL RULES TO DIRECT OUR CONCEPTIONS OF THINGS.
_/\. GREAT part of what has been already written is designed to lay a foundation for those rules which may guide and regulate our conceptions of things ; this is our main business and design in the First Part of Logick. Now if we can but direct our thoughts to a just and happy manner in forming our ideas of things, the other operations of the mind will not so easily be perverted ; because most of our errors in judgment, and the weakness, fallacy and mistakes of our argumentation, proceed from the darkness, con- tusion, defect, or some other irregularity in our conceptions. The rules to assist and direct our conceptions are these :
1. Conceive of things clearly and distinctly in their own natures.
2. Conceive of things completely in all their parts.
3. Conceive of things comprehensively in all their properties and relations
4. Conceive of things extensively in all their kinds. 6. Conceive of things orderly, or in a proper method.
SECTION I.
OR GAINING CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS.
The first rule is this, Seek after a clear and distinct conception of things as they are in their own nature, and do not content yourselves with obscure and confused ideas, where clearer are to be attained.
There are some things indeed whereof distinct ideas are scarce attainable, they seem to surpass the capacity of the understanding in our present state ; such are the notions of eternal, immense, infinite, whether this infinity be applied to number, as an infinite multitude; to quantity, as infinite length, or breadth; to powers and perfections, as strength, wisdom, or goodness infinite, &c. Though mathematicians in their way demonstrate several things in the doctrine of infinites, yet there are still some insolvable difficulties that attend the ideas of infinity, when it is applied to mind or body ; and while it is in reality but an idea ever growing, we cannot have so clear and distinct a conception of it as to secure us from mistakes in some of our reasonings about it.
There are many other things that belong to the material world, wherein the sharpest philosophers have never yet arrived at clear and distinct ideas ; such as the particular shape, situation, contexture and motion of the small particles of minerals, metals, plants, &c. whereby their very natures and essences are distinguished from each other. Nor have we either senses or instruments sufficiently nice and accurate to find them out There are other things in the world of spirits wherein our ideas are very dark and con- fused, such as their union with animal nature, the way of their acting on material beings, and their converse with each other. And though it is a laudable ambition to search what may be known of these matters, yet it is a vast hindrance to the enrich- ment of our understandings if we spend too much of our time and pains among infinites
Chap. 0. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 45
and unsearchable*, and those things for the investigation whereof we are not furnished with proper faculties in the present state. It is therefore of great service to the true improvement of the mind, to distinguish well between knowables and unknowables.
As far as things are knowable by us, it is of excellent use to accustom ourselves to clear and distinct ideas. Now among many other occasions of the darkness and mis- takes of our minds, there are these two things which most remarkably bring confusion into our ideas.
1. That from our infancy we have had the ideas of things so far connected with the ideas of words, that we often mistake words for things, we mingle and confound one with the other.
2. From our youngest years we have been ever ready to consider things not so much in their own natures, as in their various respects to ourselves, and chiefly to our senses ; and we have also joined and mingled the ideas of some things, with many other ideas, to which they were not akin in their own natures.
In order therefore to a clear and distinct knowledge of things, we must unclothe them of all these relations and mixtures, that we may contemplate them naked, and in their own natures, and distinguish the subject that we have in view from all other sub- jects whatsoever : Now to perform this well, we must here consider the definition of words, and the definition of things.
SECTION II.
OF THE DEFINITION OF WORDS OR NAMES.
If we could conceive of things as angels and unbodied spirits do, without involving them in those clouds which words and language throw upon them, we should seldom be in danger of such mistakes as are perpetually committed by us in the present state ; and indeed it would be of unknown advantage to us to accustom ourselves to form ideas of things without words, that we might know them in their own proper natures. But since we must use words, both to learn and to communicate most of our notions, we should do it with just rules of caution. I have already declared in part, how often and by what means our words become the occasion of errors in our conceptions of things. To remedy such inconveniencies, we must get an exact definition of the words we make use of, that is, we must determine precisely the sense of our words, which is called the definition of the name.
Now a definition of the name being only a declaration in what sense the word is used, or what idea or object we mean by it, this may be expressed by any one or more of the properties, effects or circumstances of that object which do sufficiently distinguish it from other objects : As if I were to tell what I mean by the word air, I may say, it is that thin matter which we breathe in and breathe out continually; or it is that fluid body in which the birds fly a little above the earth ; or it is that invisible matter which fills all places near the earth, or which immediately encompasses the globe of earth and water. So if I would tell what I mean by light, I would say it is that medium whereby we see the colours and shapes of things ; or it is that which distinguishes the day from the night. If I were asked what 1 mean by religion, I would answer, it is a collection of all our duties to God, if taken in a strict and limited sense; but if taken in a
46* LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part!.
large sense, it is a collection of all our duties both to God and man. These are called the definitions of the name.
Note, In defining the name there is no necessity that we should be acquainted with the intimate essence or nature of the thing ; for any manner of description that will but sufficiently acquaint another person what we mean by such a word, is a sufficient defi- nition for the name. And on this account, a synonymous word, or a mere negation of the contrary, a translation of the word into another tongue, or a grammatical expli- cation of it, is sometimes sufficient for this purpose ; as if one would know what I mean by a sphere, I tell him it is a globe ; if he ask what is a triangle, it is that which has three angles ; or an oval is that which has the shape of an e^g. Dark is that which has no light : Asthma is a difficulty of breathing ; a diaphoretick medicine, or a sudorifick, is something that will provoke sweating ; and an insolvent, is a man that cannot pay his debts.
Since it is the design of logick, not only to assist us in learning but in teaching also, it is necessary that we should be furnished with some particular directions relating to the definition of names, both in teaching and learning.
SECTION III.
DIRECTIONS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF NAMES.
Direction I. Have a care of making use of mere words, instead of ideas, that is, such words as have no meaning, no definition belonging to them : Do not always imagine that there are ideas wheresoever there are names : For though mankind hath so many millions of ideas, more than they have names, yet so foolish and lavish are we, that too often we use some words in mere waste, and have no ideas for them ; or at least, our ideas are so exceedingly shattered and confused, broken and blended, various and un- settled, that they can signify nothing toward the improvement of the understanding. You will find a great deal of reason for this remark, if you read the popish schoolmen ; or the mystick divines.
Never rest satisfied therefore with mere words which have no ideas belonging to them, or at least no settled and determinate ideas. Deal not in such empty ware, whether you are a learner or a teacher; for hereby some persons have made themselves rich in words, and learned in their own esteem ; whereas in reality their understandings have been poor, and they knew nothing.
Let me give, for instance, some of those writers or talkers who deal much in the words nature, fate, luck, chance, perfection, power, life, fortune, instinct, &c. and that even in the most calm and instructive parts of their discourse ; though neither they themselves nor their hearers have any settled meaning under those words ; and thus they build up their reasonings, and infer what they please, with an ambition of the name of learning, or of sublime elevations in religion ; whereas in truth, they do but amuse themselves and their admirers with swelling words of vanity, understanding neither what they say, nor whereof they affirm. But this sort of talk was reproved of old by the two chief apostles, St. Peter and St. Paul; 1 Tim. i. 7. and 2 Peter ii. 18.
When pretenders to philosophy or good sense grow fond of this sort of learning, they dazzle and confound their weaker hearers, but fall under the neglect of the wise. The
Chap. 6. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 47
Epicureans are guilty of tins fault, when they ascribe the formation of the world to chance : The Aristotelians, when they say nature abhors a vacuum : The Stoics, when they talk of fate, which is superior to the gods : And the gamesters, when they curse their ill-luck, or hope for the favours of fortune. Whereas, if they would tell us, that by the word nature they mean the properties of any being, or the order of things estab- lished at the creation ; that by the word fate, they intend the decrees of God, or the necessary connection and influence of second causes and effects ; if by the word luck or chance they signify the absolute negation of any determinate cause, or only their ignorance of any such cause, we should know how to converse with thein, <<nd to assent to, or dissent from their opinions. But while they flutter in the dark, and make a noise with words which have no fixed ideas, they talk to the wind, and can never profit.
I would make this matter a little plainer still by instances borrowed from the Peri- patetick Philosophy, which was once taught in all the schools. The professor fancies he has assigned the true reason, why all heavy bodies tend downward, why amber will draw feathers or straws, and the loadstone draw iron, when he tells you, that this is done by certain gravitating and attractive qualities, which proceed from the substantial forms of those various bodies. He imagines that he has explained why the loadstone's* north pole shall repel the north end of a magnetick needle and attract the south, when he affirms that this is done by its sympathy with one end of it, and its antipathy against the other end. Whereas in truth, all these names of sympathy, antipathy, substantial forms and qualities, when they are put for the causes of these effects in bodies, are but hard words, which only express a learned and pompous ignorance of the true cause of natural appearances ; and in this sense they are mere words without ideas.
This will evidently appear, if one ask me, Why a concave mirror or convex glass will burn wood in the sun-beams, or why a wedge will cleave it? and I should tell him, it is by an ustorious quality in the mirror or glass, and by a cleaving power in the wedge, arising from a certain unknown substantial form in them, whence they derive these qua- lities ; or if he should ask me, Why a clock strikes, and points to the hour ? and I should say, it is by an indicating form and sonoritick quality ; whereas I ought to tell him how the sun-beams are collected and united by a burning glass ; whence the mecha- nical force of a wedge is derived ; and what are the wheels and springs, the pointer, and hammer, and bell, whereby a clock gives notice of the time, both to the eye and the ear. But these ustorious and cleaving powers, sonorous and indicating- forms and qua- lities, do either teach the inquirer nothing at all but what he knew before, or they are mere words without ideas, f
And there is many a man in the vulgar and in the learned world, who imagines himself deeply skilled in the controversies of divinity, whereas he has only furnished
* Note, Some writers call that the south pole of a loadstone which attracts the south end of the needle ; but 1 choose to follow lliose who call it the north pole.
t It may be objected here, " And what does the modern philosopher, with all his detail of mathematical numbers and diagrams, do more than this toward the solution of these difficulties'? Does he not describe gravity by a cerlain unknown force, whereby bodies tend downward to the centre? Halh he found the certain and mechanical reasons of attraction, magnetism, &c." I answer, That the moderns have found a thousand things by applying mathematics to natural philosophy, which the ancients were ignorant of; and when they use any names of this kind, viz. gravitation, attraction, <Sc they use them only to signify, that there are such effects and such causes, with a frequent confession of their ignorance of the true springs of them : They do not pretend to make tlie^e words stand for the real causes of things, as though they thereby assigned the true philosophical solution of these difficulties; for in this sense they will still be words without ideas, whether in the mouth of an old philosopher or a new one.
48 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part t.
himself with a parcel of scholastic or mystic words, under some of which the authors themselves had no just ideas ; and the learner when he hears, or pronounces them, hath scarce any ideas at all. Such sort of words sometimes have become matters of immortal contention, as though the gospel could not stand without them ; and yet the zealot per- haps knows little more of them than he does of Shibboleth, or Higgaion, Selah. Judges xii. 6. Psalm ix. 16.
Yet here 1 would lay down this caution, that there are several objects of which we have not a clear and distinct idea, much less an adequate or comprehensive one, and yet we cannot call the names of these things, words without ideas ; such are the infinity and eternity of God himself, the union of our own soul and body, the union of the divine and human natures in Jesus Christ, the operation of the Holy Spirit on the mind of man, &c. These ought not to be called words without ideas, for there is sufficient evidence for the reality and certainty of the existence of their objects; though there is some confusion in our clearest conceptions of them ; and our ideas of them, though imperfect, are yet sufficient to converse about them, so far as we have need, and to determine so much as is necessary for our own faith and practice.
Direction II. Do not suppose that the natures or essences of things always differ from one another, as much as their names do. There are various purposes in human life, for which we put very different names on the same thing, or on things whose natures are near akin ; and thereby oftentimes, by making a new nominal species, we are ready to deceive ourselves with the idea of another real species of beings : And those, whose understandings are led away by the mere sound of words, fancy the nature of those things to be very different whose names are so, and judge of them accordingly.
I may borrow a remarkable instance for my purpose almost out of every garden, which contains a variety of plants iu it. Most or all plants agree in this, that they have a root, a stalk, leaves, buds, blossoms and seeds : But the gardener ranges them under very different names, as though they were really different kinds of beings, merely because of the different use and service to which they are applied by men : As for instance, those plants whose roots are eaten, shall appropriate the name of roots to themselves ; such are carrots, turnips, radishes, &c. If the leaves are of chief use to us, then we call them herbs ; as sage, mint, thyme : If the leaves are eaten raw, they are termed sallad ; as lettuce, purslain : If boiled, they become pot-herbs ; as spinage, coleworts ; and some of those same plants, which are pot-herbs in one family, are sallad in another. If the buds are made our food, they are called heads, or tops ; so cabbage heads, heads of asparagus and artichokes. If the blossom be of most importance, we call it a flower ; such are daisies, tulips, and carnations, which are the mere blossoms of those plants. If the husk or seeds are eaten, they are called the fruits of the ground, as peas, beans, strawberries, &c. If any part of the plant be of known and common use to us in medi- cine, we call it a physical herb, as carduus, scurvy-grass; but if we count no part useful, we call it a weed, and throw it out of the garden ; and yet perhaps our next neighbour knows some valuable property and use of it; he plants it in his garden, and gives it the title of an herb or a flower. You see here how small is the real distinction of these several plants, considered in their general nature as the lesser vegetables : Yet what very different ideas we vulgarly form concerning them, and make different species of them, chiefly because of the different names given them.
IVow when things are set in this clear light, it appears how ridiculous it would be for
Chap. 6. LOGICK : OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 49
two persons to contend, whether dandelion be an herb or a weed ; whether it be a pot-herb or sallad; when by the custom or fancy of different families, this one plant obtains all these names according to the several uses of it, and the value that is put upon it.
Note here, That I find no manner of fault with the variety of names which are given to several plants, according to the various uses we make of them. But I would not have our judgments imposed upon hereby, to think that these mere nominal species, viz. herbs, sallad, and weeds, become three really different species of beings, on this account, that they have different names and uses. But I proceed to other instances.
It has been the custom of mankind, when they have been angry with any thing, to add a new ill name to it, that they may convey thereby a hateful idea of it, though the nature of the thing still abides the same. So the papists call the protestants, heretics : A profane person calls a man of piety, a precisian : And in the times of the civil war, in the last century, the royalists called the parliamentarians, fanatics, roundheads, and sectaries. And they in requital called the royalists, malignants : But the partizans on each side were really neither better nor worse for these .names.
It has also been a frequent practice, on the other hand, to put new favourable names upon ill ideas, on purpose to take off the odium of them. But notwithstanding all these flattering names and titles, a man of profuse generosity is but a spendthrift ; a natural son is a bastard still ; a gallant is an adulterer ; and a lady of pleasure is a whore.
Direction III. Take heed of believing the nature and essence of two or more things to be certainly the same, because they may have the same name given them. This has been an unhappy and fatal occasion of a thousand mistakes in the natural, in the civil, and in the religious affairs of life, both amongst the vulgar and the learned. I shall give two or three instances, chiefly in the matters of natural philosophy, having hinted several dangers of this kind relating to theology, in the foregoing discourse concerning equivocal words.
Our elder philosophers have generally made use of the word soul to signify that prin- ciple whereby a plant grows, and they called it the vegetative soul : The principle of the animal motion of a brute has been likewise called a soul, and we have been taught to name it the sensitive soul : They have also given the name soul to that superior prin- ciple in man, whereby he thinks, judges, reasons, &c. and though they distinguished this by the honourable title of the rational soul, yet in common discourse and writing we leave out the words vegetative, sensitive, and rational ; and make the word soul serve for all these principles : Thence we are led early into this imagination, that there is a sort of spiritual being in plants and in brutes, like that in men. Whereas if we did but abstract and separate these things from words, and compare the cause of growth in a plant, with the cause of reasoning in man, without the word soul, we should never think that these two principles were at all like one another; nor should we perhaps so easily and peremptorily conclude, that brutes need an intelligent mind to perform their animal actions.
Another instance may be the word life, which being attributed to plants, to brutes, and to men, and in each of them ascribed to the soul, has very easily betrayed us from our infancy into this mistake, that the spirit or mind, or thinking principle, in man, is the spring of vegetative and animal life to his body : Whereas it is evident,
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50 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part U
that if the spirit or thinking principle of man gave life to his animal nature, the way to save men from dying would not be to use medicines, but to persuade the spirit to abide in the body.
I might derive a third instance from the word heat, which is used to signify the sensation we have when we are near the fire, as well as the cause of that sensation, which is in the fire itself; and thence we conclude from our infancy, that there is a sort of heat in the fire resembling our own sensation, or the heat which we feel : Whereas in the fire there is nothing but little particles of matter, of such particular shapes, sizes, situations and motions, as are fitted to impress such motions on our flesh or nerves as excite the sense of heat. Now if this cause of our sensation in the fire had been always called by a distinct name, perhaps we had not been so rooted in this mistake, that the fire is hot with the same sort of heat that we feel. This will appear with more evidence, when we consider that we are secure from the same mistake where there have been two different names allotted to our sensation, and to the cause of it ; as, we do not say, pain is in the fire that burns us, or in the knife that cuts and wounds us ; for we call it burning in the fire, cutting in the knife, and pain only when it is in ourselves.
Numerous instances of this kind might be derived from the words sweet, sour, loud, shrill, and almost all the sensible qualities, whose real natures we mistake from our very infancy, and we are ready to suppose them to be the same in us, and in the bodies that cause them ; partly, because the words which signify our own sensations are applied also to signify those unknown shapes and motions of the little corpuscles, which excite and cause those sensations.
Direction IV. In conversation or reading be diligent to find out the true sense, or dis- tinct idea, which the speaker or writer affixes to his words, and especially to those words which are the chief subject of his discourse. As far as possible take heed, lest you put more or fewer ideas into one word, than the person did when he wrote or spoke ; and endeavour that your ideas of every word may be the same as his were : Then you will judge better of what he speaks or writes.
It is for want of this that men quarrel in the dark; and that there are so many contentions in the several sciences, and especially in divinity. Multitudes of them arise from a mistake of the true sense or complete meaning in which words are used by the writer or speaker ; and hereby sometimes they seem to agree, when they really differ in their sentiments : And sometimes they seem to differ when they really agree. Let me give an instance of both.
When one man by the word church shall understand all that believe in Christ ; and another by the word church means only the church of Rome ; they may both assent to this proposition, there is no salvation out of the church, and yet their inward sentiments may be widely different.
Again, if one writer shall affirm that virtue added to faith is sufficient to make a christian, and another shall as zealously deny this proposition, they seem to differ widely in words, and yet perhaps they may both really agree in sentiment : If by the word virtue, the affirmer intends our whole duty to God and man ; and the denier by the word virtue means only courage ; or at most our duty towards our neighbour, without including in the idea of it the duty which we owe to God.
Chap. 6. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 51
Many such sort of contentions as these are, if traced to their original, wilt be found to be mere logomachies or strifes and quarrels about names and words, and vain janglings, as the apostle calls them in his first letter of advice to Timothy.
In order therefore to attain clear and distinct ideas of what we read and hear, we must search the sense of words ; we must consider what is their original and derivation in our own or foreign languages ; what is their common sense amongst mankind, or in other authors, especially such as wrote in the same country, in the same age, about the same time, and upon the same subjects : We must consider in what sense the same author uses any particular word or phrase, and that when he is discoursing on the same matter, and especially about the same parts or paragraphs of his writing : We must consider whether the word be used in a strict and limited, or in a large and general sense ; whether in a literal, in a figurative, or in a prophetic sense ; whether it has any secondary idea annexed to it besides the primary or chief sense. We must inquire further, what is the scope and design of the writer ; and what is the connection of that sentence with those that go before it, and those which follow it. By these and other methods, we are to search out the definition of names, that is, the true sense and meaning in which any author or speaker uses any word, which may be the chief subject of discourse, or may carry any considerable importance in it.
Direction V. When we communicate our notions to others, merely with a design to inform and improve their knowledge, let us in the beginning of our discourse take care to adjust the definition of names wheresoever there is need of it; that is, to determine plainly what we mean by the chief words which are the subject of our discourse; and be sure always to keep the same ideas, whensoever we use the same words, unless we give due notice of the change. This will have a very large and happy influence, in securing not only others but ourselves too from confusion and mistake ; for even writers and speakers themselves, for want of due watchfulness, are ready to affix dif- ferent ideas to their own words, in different parts of their discourses, and hereby bring perplexity into their own reasonings, and confound their hearers.
It is by an observation of this rule that mathematicians have so happily secured themselves, and the sciences which they have professed, from wrangling and controversy ; because whensoever in the progress of their treatises they have occasion to use a new and unknown word, they always define it, and tell in what sense they shall take it ; and i ia many of their writings you find a heap of definitions at the very beginning. Now if the writers of natural philosophy and morality had used the same accuracy and care, they had effectually secluded a multitude of noisy and fruitless debates out of their several provinces ; nor had that sacred theme of divinity been perplexed with so many intricate disputes, nor the church of Christ been torn to pieces by so many sects and factions, if the words grace, faith, righteousness, repentance, justification, worship, church, bishop, presbyters, &c. had been well defined, and their significations adjusted, as near as possible, by the use of those words in the New Testament; or at least, if every writer had told us at first in what sense he would use those words.
Direction VI. In your own studies, as well as in the communication of your thoughts to others, merely for their information, avoid ambiguous and equivocal terms as much as possible. Do not use such words as have two or three definitions of the name belonging to them, that is, such words as have two or three senses, where there is any
h 2
52 LOGICK : OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part 1.
danger of mistake. Where your chief business is to inform the judgment, and to explain a matter, rather than to persuade or affect, be not fond of expressing your- selves in figurative language, when there are any proper words that signify the same 'dea in their literal sense. It is the ambiguity of names, as we have often said, that orings almost infinite confusion into our conceptions of things.
But where there is a necessity of using an ambiguous word, there let double care be used in defining that word and declaring in what sense you take it. And be sure to suffer no ambiguous word ever to come into your definitions.
Direction VII. In communicating your notions, use every word as near as possible in the same sense in which mankind commonly use it ; or which writers that have gone before .you have usually affixed to it, upon condition that it is free from ambiguity. Though names are in their original merely arbitrary, yet we should always keep to the established meaning of them, unless great necessity require the alteration ; for when any word has been used to signify an idea, that old idea will recur in the mind when the word is heard or read rather than any new idea which we may fasten to it. And this is one reason why the received definition of names should be changed as little as possible.
But I add farther, that though a word entirely new, introduced into a language, may be affixed to what idea you please, yet an old word ought never to be fixed to an unaccustomed idea, without just and evident necessity, or without present or previous notice, lest we introduce thereby a licence for all manner of pernicious equivocations and falsehoods ; as for instance, when an idle boy who has not seen his book all the morning, shall tell his master that he has learned his lesson, he can never excuse himself by saying, that by the word lesson he meant his breakfast, and by the word learn he meant eating ; surely this would be construed a downright lie, and his fancied wit would hardly procure his pardon.
In using an ambiguous word, which has been used in different senses, we may choose what we think the most proper sense, as I have done, p. 47, in naming the poles of the loadstone, north or south.
And when a word has been used in two or three senses, and has made a great inroad for error upon that account, it is of good service to drop one or two of those senses, and leave it only one remaining, and fix the other senses or ideas to other words. So the modern philosophers, when they treat of the human soul, they call it the mind, or mens humana, and leave the word anima, or soul, to signify the principle of life and motion in mere animal beings.
The poet Juvenal has long ago given us a hint of this accuracy and distinction, ay hen he says of brutes and men :
Indulsit niiuiili communis conditor illis
Tantum animas; nobis animum quoque. — Sat. ix. v. 134.
Exception. There is one case, wherein some of these last rules concerning the definition of words, may be in some measure dispensed with ; and that is, when strong and rooted prejudice hath established some favourite word or phrase, and long used it to express some mistaken notion, or to unite some inconsistent ideas ; for then it is sometimes much easier to lead the world into truth by indulging their fondness for a phrase, and by assigning and applying new ideas and notions to their favourite word ; and this is much safer also than to awaken all their passions by rejecting both their old
Chap. 6. LOGICK : OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 53
words, and phrases, and notions, and introducing all new at once : Therefore we continue to say, there is heat in the fire, there is coldness in ice, rather than invent new words to express the powers which are in fire or ice, to excite the sensations of heat or cold in us. For the same reason some words and phrases which are less proper, may be continued in theology, while people are led into clearer ideas with much more ease and success, than if an attempt were made to change all their beloved forms of speech.
In other cases, these logical directions should generally be observed, and different names affixed to different ideas.
Here 1 cannot but take occasion to remark, that it is a considerable advantage to any language to have a variety of new words introduced into it, that when in course of time new objects and new ideas arise, there may be new words and names assigned to them : And also where one single name has sustained two or three ideas in time past, these new words may remove the ambiguity by being affixed to some of those ideas. This practice would, by degrees, take away part of the uncertainty of language. And for this reason I cannot but congratulate our English tongue, that it has been abundantly enriched with the translation of words from all our neighbour nations, as well as from ancient languages, and these words have been as it were enfranchised amongst us ; for French, Latin, Greek, and German names will signify English ideas, as well as words that are anciently and. entirely English.
It may not be amiss to mention in this place, that as the determination of the particular sense in which any word is used is called the definition of the name, so the enumeration of the various senses of an equivocal word is sometimes called the division or distinction of the name ; and for this purpose good dictionaries are of excellent use.
This distinction of the name or word is greatly necessary in argumentation or dispute ; when a fallacious argument is used, he that answers it distinguishes the several senses of some word or phrase in it, and shews in what sense it is true, and in what sense it is as evidently false.
SECTION IV.
OF THE DEFINITION OF THINGS.
As there is much confusion introduced into our ideas, by the means of those words to which they are affixed, so the mingling our ideas with each other without caution, is a further occasion whereby they become confused. A court lady, born and bred up amongst pomp and equipage, and the vain notions of birth and quality, constantly joins and mixes all these with the idea of herself, and she imagines these to be essential to her nature, and as it were necessary to her being : Thence she is tempted to look upon menial servants, and the lowest rank of mankind, as another species of beings, quite distinct from herself. A plow-boy, that has never travelled beyond his own village, and has seen nothing but thatched houses, and his parish church, is naturally led to imagine that thatch belongs to the very nature of a house, and that that must be a church which is built of stone, and especially if it has a spire upon it. A child, whose uncle has been excessive fond, and his schoolmaster very severe, easily believes that fondness always belongs to uncles, and that severity is essential to masters or instructors. He has seen also soldiers with red coats, or ministers with long black gowns, and
54r LOGICK : OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part l.
therefore he persuades himself that these garbs are essential to the characters, and that he is not a minister who has not a long black gown, nor can he be a soldier who is not dressed in red. It would be well if all such mistakes ended with childhood.
It might be also subjoined, that our complex ideas become confused, not only by uniting or blending together more simple or single ideas than really belong to them, as in the instances just mentioned ; but obscurity and confusion sometimes come upon our ideas also, for want of uniting a sufficient number of single ideas to make the complex one : So if I conceive of a leopard only as a spotted beast, this does not distinguish it from a tyger or a lynx, nor from many dogs or horses, which are spotted too ; and therefore a leopard must have some more ideas added to complete and distinguish it.
I grant that it is a large and free acquaintance with the world, a watchful observation and diligent search into the nature of things, that must fully correct this kind of errors : The rules of logick are not sufficient to do it; but yet the rules of logick may instruct us by what means to distinguish one thing from another, and how to search and mark out, as far as may be, the contents and limits of the nature of distinct beings, and thus may give us great assistance towards the remedy of these mistakes.
As the definition of names frees us from that confusion which words introduce, so the definition of things will in some measure guard us against that confusion which mingled ideas have introduced : For as a definition of the name explains what any word means, so a definition of the thing explains what is the nature of that thing.
In order to form a definition of any thing, we must put forth these three acts of the mind :
First, Compare the thing to be defined with other things that are most like to itself, and see wherein its essence or nature agrees with them ; and this is called the genera] nature or genus in a definition : So if you would define what wine is, first compare it with other things like itself, as cyder, perry, &c. and you will find it agrees essentially with them in this, that it is a sort of juice.
Secondly, Consider the most remarkable and primary attribute, property, or idea wherein this thing differs from those other things that are most like it ; and that is its essential or specific difference ; so wine differs from cyder and perry, and all other juices, in that it is pressed from a grape. This may be called its special nature, which distinguishes it from other juices.
Thirdly, Join the general and special nature together, or, which is all one, the genus and the difference, and these make up a definition. So the juice of a grape, or juice pressed from grapes, is the definition of wine.
So if I would define what winter is, I consider first wherein it agrees with other things which are most like it, namely, summer, spring, autumn, and I find they are all seasons of the year ; therefore, a season of the year is the genus. Then I observe wherein it differs from these, and that is in the shortness of the days ; for it is this which does primarily distinguish it from other seasons ; therefore this may be called its special nature, or its difference. Then by joining these together I make a definition. Winter is that season of the year wherein the days are shortest. I confess indeed this is but a ruder definition of it, for to define it as an accurate astronomer, I must limit the days, hours and minutes.
After the same manner, if we would explain or define what the picture of a man is,
Chap. 6. LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. 55
we consider first the genus, or general nature of it, which is a representation ; and herein it agrees with many other things, as a statue, a shadow, a print, a verbal description of a man, &e. Then we consider wherein it differs from these, and we find it differs from a verbal description in that it is a representation to the eye, and not to the ear ; it differs from a statue, in that it is a representation upon a flat surface, and not in a solid figure : It differs from a shadow, in that it is an abiding representation, and not a fleeting one : It differs from a print or draught, because it represents the colours by paint, as well as the shape of the object by delineation. Now so many, or rather so few of these ideas put together, as are just sufficient to distinguish a picture from all other representations, make up its essential difference, or its special nature ; and all these are included in its being painted on a plain surface. Then join this to the genus, which is a representation ; and thus you have the complete definition of the picture of a man, namely, it is the representation of a man in paint upon a surface, or a plane.
Here it must be observed, that when we speak of the genus and difference as composing a definition, it must always be understood that the nearest genus, and the specific difference are required.
The next general nature, or the nearest genus, must be used in a definition, because it includes all the rest as parts of its complex idea ; as if I would define wine, I must say, wine is a juice, which is the nearest genus; and not say, wine is a liquid, which is a remote general nature ; or wine is a substance, which is yet more remote, for juice includes both substance and liquid. Besides, neither of these two remote general natures would make any distinction between wine and a thousand other substances, or other liquids, a remote genus leaves the thing too much undistinguished.
The specific difference is that primary attribute which distinguishes each species from one another, while they stand ranked under the same general nature or genus. Though wine differs from other liquids, in that it is the juice of a certain fruit, yet this is but a general or generic difference, for it does not distinguish wine from cyder or perry ; the specific difference of wine therefore is its pressure from the grape ; as cyder is pressed from apples, and perry from pears.
In definitions also we must use the primary attribute that distinguishes the species or special nature, and not attempt to define wine by its particular tastes, or effects, or other properties, which are but secondary or consequential, when its pressure from the grape is the most obvious and primary distinction of it from all other juices. I confess in some cases it is not so easily known which is the primary idea that distinguishes one thing from another ; and therefore some would as soon define winter by the coldness of the season, as by the shortness of the days : Though the shortness of the days is doubtless the most just, primary, and philosophical difference betwixt that and the other seasons of the year, since winter days are always shortest, but not always the coldest : I add also, that the shortness of the days is one cause of the coldness, but the cold is no cause of their shortness.
SECTION V.
RULES OF DEFINITION OF THE THING.
The special rules of a good definition are these :
Rule I. A definition must be universal, or as some call it, adequate ; that is, it must
56 LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Part 1.
agree to all the particular species or individuals that are included under the same idea; so the juice of the grape agrees to all proper wines, whether red, white, French, Spanish, Florence, &c.
Rule II. It must be proper and peculiar to the thing denned, and agree to that alone ; for it is the very design of a definition effectually to distinguish one thing from all others : So the juice of the grape agrees to no other substance, to no other liquid, to no other being but wine.
These two rules being observed, will always render a definition reciprocal with the thing defined ; which is a scholastic way of speaking, to signify that the definition may be used in any sentence in the place of the thing defined ; or they may be mutually affirmed concerning each other, or substituted in the room of each other. The juice of the grape is wine, or wine is the juice of the grape. And wheresoever the word wine is used, you may put the juice of the grape instead of it, except when you consider wine rather as a word than a thing, or when it is mentioned in such logical rules.
Rule III. A definition ought to be clear and plain ; for the design of it is to lead us into the knowledge of the thing defined.
Hence it will follow, that the words used in a definition ought not to be doubtful, and equivocal, and obscure, but as plain and easy as the language will afford : And indeed it is a general rule concerning the definition of both names and things, that no word should be used in either of them, which has any darkness or difficulty in it, unless it has been before explained or defined.
Hence it will follow also, that there are many things which cannot well be defined either as to the name or the thing, unless it be by synonimous words, or by a negation of the contrary idea, &c. for learned men know not how to make them more evident, or more intelligible, than the ideas which every man has gained by the vulgar methods of teaching. Such are the ideas of extension, duration, thought, consciousness, and most of our simple ideas, and particularly sensible qualities, as white, blue, red, cold, heat, shrill, bitter, sour, &c.
We can say of duration, that it is a continuance in being, or a not ceasing to be; we can say of consciousness, that it is as it were a feeling within ourselves ; we may say heat is that which is not cold ; or sour is that which is like vinegar ; or we may point to the clear sky, and say that is blue. These are the vulgar methods of teaching the definitions of names, or meaning of words. But there are some philosophers, whose attempts to define these things learnedly, have wrapped up their ideasin greater darkness, and exposed themselves to ridicule and contempt ; as when they define heat, they say, it is qualitas congregans homogenea ct segregans heierogeneu, that is, a quality gathering together things of the same kind, and separating things of a different kind. So they define white, a colour arising from the prevalency of brightness : But every child knows hot and white better without these definitions.
There are many other definitions given by the peripatetick philosophers, which are very faulty by reason of their obscurity ; as motion is defined by them the act of a being in power, so far forth as it is in power. Time is the measure or number of motion accord- ing to past, present and future. The soul is the act of an organical natural body, iiaviDg life in power; and several others of the same stamp.
Rule IV. It is also commonly prescribed amongst the rules of definition, that it should be short, so that it must have no tautology in it, nor any words superfluous.
Chap. 6\ L0G1CK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OE REASON. 57
I confess, definitions ought to be expressed in us few words as is consistent with a clear and just explication of the nature of the thing defined, and a distinction of it from all other things beside : But it is of much more importance, and far better, that a definition should explain clearly the subject we treat of, though the words be many, than to leave obscurities in the sentence, by confining- it within too narrow limits. So in the definition which we have given of Logick, that it is the art of using reason well in the search after truth and the communication of it to others, it has indeed many words in it, but it could not well be shorter. Art is the genus wherein it agrees with rhetoric, poesy, arith- metic, wrestling, sailing, building, &c. for all these are arts also : But the difference or special nature of it is drawn from its object, reason ; from the act, using it well, and from its two great ends or designs, namely, the search after truth, and the communica- tion of it; nor can it be justly described and explained in fewer ideas.
Rule V. If we add a fifth rule, it must be, that neither the thing defined- nor a mere synonymous name, should make any part of the definition, for this would be no explication of the nature of the thing ; and a synonymous word at best could only be a definition of the name.
SECTION VI.
OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF THINGS.
Before I part with this subject, I must propose several observations which relate to the definition of things.
1. There is no need that in definitions we should be confined to one single attribute or property, in order to express the difference of the thing defined, for sometimes the essential difference consists in two or three ideas or attributes. So a grocer is a man who buys and sells sugar, and